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Quantum List Decoding of Classical Block Codes of
Polynomially Small Rate from Quantumly Corrupted Codewords∗
Tomoyuki Yamakami†
Abstract. Given a classical error-correcting block code, the task of quantum list decoding is
to produce from any quantumly corrupted codeword a short list containing all messages whose
codewords exhibit high “presence” in the quantumly corrupted codeword. Efficient quantum list
decoders have been used to prove a quantum hardcore property of classical codes. However, the
code rates of all known families of efficiently quantum list-decodable codes are, unfortunately, too
small for other practical applications. To improve those known code rates, we prove that a specific
code family of polynomially small code rate over a fixed code alphabet, obtained by concatenating
generalized Reed-Solomon codes as outer codes with Hadamard codes as inner codes, has an
efficient quantum list-decoding algorithm if its codewords have relatively high codeword presence
in a given quantumly corrupted codeword. As an immediate application, we use the quantum list
decodability of this code family to solve a certain form of quantum search problems in polynomial
time. When the codeword presence becomes smaller, in contrast, we show that the quantum list
decodability of generalized Reed-Solomon codes with high confidence is closely related to the
efficient solvability of the following two problems: the noisy polynomial interpolation problem
and the bounded distance vector problem. Moreover, assuming that NP * BQP, we also prove
that no efficient quantum list decoder exists for the generalized Reed-Solomon codes.
Keywords: quantum computation, block error-correcting code, quantum list decoding, quan-
tumly corrupted codeword, quantum one-way function, generalized Reed-Solomon code, Hadamard
code, concatenated code
1 Quantum List Decoding
Classical list decoding, whose notion is attributed to Elias [4] and Wozencraft [24] in late 1950s, has recently
drawn significant attention after Sudan’s [19] discovery of an efficient list-decoding algorithm for well-studied
Reed-Solomon codes beyond its “traditional” error-correction radius. List decoding has since then found
useful applications to cryptography as well as computational complexity theory (see, e.g., survey articles of
Sudan [20] and Trevisan [22]). For a wider range of applications to, in particular, quantum computations,
an introduction of quantum analogue of such list decoding is an inevitable consequence.
In a seminal paper of Kawachi and Yamakami [13] (following an early work of Adcock and Cleve [1] on
biased oracles) published first in 2006, a notion of quantum list decoding of classical block codes arose quite
naturally in their study of quantum hardcore functions for arbitrary (strongly) quantum one-way functions.
A goal of quantum list decoding in Kawachi and Yamakami’s implicit-input explicit-output model is to pro-
duce a relatively short list of message candidates by means of oracle queries to a faulty quantum encoding
procedure given as a form of oracle. This model of quantum list decoding slightly differs from a conventional
transmission model between a sender and a receiver through a noisy channel, particularly, in the following
aspects. Given an original message hidden to the receiver, assumed is the existence of a faulty quantum
encoding procedure (called as a quantum-computationally corrupted codeword or quantumly corrupted code-
word) that tries to generate a code symbol at each specified block location of a desired codeword induced
from the original message. To recover the hidden message from this quantumly corrupted codeword, the
receiver is allowed to access the quantumly corrupted codeword repeatedly, partly because he cannot dupli-
cate “unknown” quantum states by a quantum-mechanical principle. The quantumly corrupted codeword is
likely to behave “adversarially” and hinder the receiver’s effort of recovering uniquely the original message.
Quite often, however, it is sufficient to produce a reasonably short list of message candidates including all the
messages whose corresponding codewords are in close proximity to the given quantumly corrupted codeword,
and thus this list certainly contains the hidden message. This “closeness” is scaled by the notion of codeword
presence (or presence, in short), which indicates the average probability of obtaining successfully each block
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pp. 153–162, Ballarat, Australia, January 30–February 2, 2007. This work was in part supported by the Mazda Foundation.
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symbol of the target codeword from the quantumly corrupted codeword (see Kawachi and Yamakami [13] for
an intuition behind this notion). Because of these differences, the classical list decodability does not generally
imply the quantum list decodability. To construct hardcore functions is the primary purpose of quantum
list decoding by Kawachi and Yamakami [13], and their study of quantum list decoding was centered at a
natural question of what types of classical block codes are efficiently quantum list decodable.
In the past literature showed several families of block codes that are classical/quantum list decodable
in polynomial time. The first of such examples is a family of Hadamard codes. In the case of classical list
decoding, Goldreich and Levin [6] proved the classical list decodability of the binary Hadamard codes, and
subsequently Goldreich, Rubinfeld, and Sudan [7] presented a general list-decoding algorithm for the q-ary
Hadamard codes. Concerning quantum list decoding, by contrast, Adcock and Cleve [1] essentially proved
that the binary Hadamard codes are quantum list decodable in polynomial time. For the q-ary Hadamard
codes, a fast quantum list-decoding algorithm was given by Kawachi and Yamakami [13]. They also presented
two additional quantum list-decodable codes: shifted Legendre symbol codes and pairwise equality codes. A
common feature of these codes is that they all have exponentially small code rate, where the rate of a code
is a ratio of message length (or a dimension of the code) and codeword’s block length. For instance, the
rate of the binary Hadamard code is exactly n/2n for message length n. Notice that, in a practical setting,
code rate and block length are important factors in designing error-correcting codes. In particular, a family
of polynomial-time classical list-decodable codes of polynomially small rate over the binary code alphabet
finds numerous applications in the fields of cryptography and computational complexity theory (refer to,
e.g., survey articles by Sudan [20] or Trevisan [22]).
All known efficiently quantum list-decodable code families have so far exponentially small code rate, which
is extremely smaller than the code rates of many practical codes. It is therefore natural to ask whether there
exists an efficiently quantum list-decodable code of polynomially small rate and of fixed alphabet size for
any given bias parameter. This paper is profoundly motivated by this intriguing question and, as its main
theorem, it will successfully prove the existence of such a code family; more strongly, we will show the
following statement.
Theorem 1 [Main Theorem] Let q be any prime constant. For any constant k ≥ 1, there exist a
polynomially-time computable function t : N→ N+ and a classical block (t(n), n)q-code family C such that
1. C is polynomial-time classically list decodable with confidence 5/6, and
2. C is polynomial-time quantumly list decodable with presence at least 1/q + 1/nk and confidence 2/3.
This code family C has code rate n/t(n), which is only polynomially small.
The rest of this paper is dedicated to proving this theorem and seeking its application.
To obtain the desired code family stated in the main theorem, we will initially seek a well-studied code
family. A family of generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes has relatively large code rate; however, it usually
has large alphabet size. From this code family, we will build a family of codes of high code rate over a
fixed code alphabet by an idea of Forney [5]. In this paper, we will use in Section 3 a concatenated code
CGRS-H of Guruswami and Sudan [10], which is obtained by concatenating the generalized Reed-Solomon
codes with the Hadamard codes. Our key claim—Theorem 7—states that the codes CGRS-H (with an
adequate choice of code parameters) are efficiently quantum list decodable as far as their codeword presence
is relatively high. Theorem 1 follows immediately from this claim, because CGRS-H was already proven to
be classically list decodable (Guruswami and Sudan [10]). As the first step toward the proof of Theorem
7, we will demonstrate in Proposition 8 that this concatenated code family possesses efficient quantum list
decodability, provided that the generalized Reed-Solomon codes are efficiently quantum list decodable. This
claim will be proven in Section 3.2 by employing a technique of constructing an efficient “quantum reduction”
between two quantumly corrupted codewords. An advantage of this proof technique is that it requires no
soft information, which is a key ingredient in the classical case of Guruswami and Sudan [9, 10].
Our next step is to show in Lemma 11 that the generalized Reed-Solomon codes are indeed efficiently
quantum list decodable, by partially applying a polynomial reconstruction algorithm of Guruswami and
Sudan [9], as far as a target codeword has relatively high presence in a given quantumly corrupted codeword.
Unfortunately, the use of such a classical algorithm makes the query complexity of our quantum list decoder
quite high. On the contrary, as the presence becomes lower, it seems to become harder to solve efficiently the
quantum list-decoding problem. For instance, when the presence is arbitrary close to a reciprocal of the code
alphabet size, we can convert an efficient quantum list-decoding algorithm to an efficient quantum algorithm
that even solves a certain NP-complete problem. This immediately leads to an unlikely consequence that
every NP-problem can be solved efficiently on a quantum computer with high success probability. In a
similar vein, we will present a direct connection between quantum list decodability of the generalized Reed-
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Solomon codes and the quantum solvability of two classical problems: the noisy polynomial interpolation
problem (NPIP) of Naor and Pinkas [15] and the bounded distance vector problem (BDVP), both of which
will be defined in Sections 4.2–4.3. To be more precise, we will show that (1) if the generalized Reed-Solomon
codes are quantumly list decodable, then the NPIP is quantumly solvable and (2) if the BDVP is quantumly
solvable, then the generalized Reed-Solomon codes are quantumly list decodable.
Our quantum list-decoding algorithm for the aforementioned concatenated code finds an immediate
application to certain types of problems. Our example in this paper is an NBQP-search problem, in which,
given a polynomial-time quantum algorithm and an input instance, we want to find a classical witness of
polynomial size that forces the algorithm to accept the input with high probability. We will show in Section
5 that solving this search problem on average implies solving it in worst case. This can be compared to a
classical case of an NP-search problem of Kumar and Sivakumar [14].
In line of the study on quantum list decoding, we will make a brief discussion in Section 6 on another
notion of local quantum list decoding based on an implicit-input implicit-output model where an outcome of a
list-decoding algorithm is a list of descriptions of quantum-circuit list decoders rather than a list of messages.
Similarly to the classical case of Sudan, Trevisan, and Vadhan [21], we can apply our quantum list decoder
for generalized Reed-Solomon codes to conduct local quantum list decoding for the Reed-Mu¨ller codes. As
an immediate consequence, we can prove the so-called hardness amplification of quantum circuits, following
the argument of Sudan, Trevisan, and Vadhan [21].
2 Foundations of Quantum List Decoding
This section explains basic notions and notation concerning quantum list decoding. Throughout this paper,
let N denote the set of all natural numbers (i.e., nonnegative integers) and set N+ = N − {0}. For any
positive integers m and n with m ≤ n, the notation [m,n]Z means the integer set {m,m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . , n}
and [n] is the shorthand for [1, n]Z whenever n ≥ 1. For any number q ∈ N+, Fq (or GF (q)) denotes a finite
(Galois) field of size q. When q is a prime number, we often express the elements of Fq in terms of the
numbers in [0, q − 1]Z. We sometimes use a prime power qm rather than a prime q. Conventionally, we also
identify each vector in (Fq)m with its corresponding element in Fqm . Let Q and C respectively denote the
sets of all rational numbers and of all complex numbers. We further set Q≥0 = {r ∈ Q | r ≥ 0}.
For a finite alphabet Σ, a string x over Σ is a finite sequence of symbols from Σ, and |x| denotes the
length of x (i.e., the number of all the occurrences of symbols in x).
2.1 Classical Block Codes
We briefly explain classical block (error-correcting) codes, which are key objects of our interest. Roughly
speaking, a (block) code is a set of strings of the same length over a finite alphabet Σ and each string of
a code is indexed by a message and is called a codeword. In this paper, we mostly deal with a family of
codes, each of which corresponds to a different message length n in N. Such a code family can be specified
in general by a series (Σn, In,Γn) of triplets composed of message space Σn, index set In, and code alphabet
Γn for each message length
‡ n (which serves as a “basis parameter” in this paper).
As standard nowadays in computational complexity theory, we view a code C (or C(n), to emphasize
“n”) for each fixed message length n as a “function” that maps Σn× In to Γn. For convenience, let the code
size N(n) = |Σn| and let the code alphabet size q(n) = |Γn|. It is also convenient to assume that Σn = (Σ′)n
for a certain fixed message alphabet Σ′ so that n actually represents the length of messages in Σn over Σ′;
in this case, n = log|Σ′|N(n) holds for every length n ∈ N. For instance, if Σ′ = {0, 1}, then all messages
can be expressed in binary. By abbreviating C(x, y) as Cx(y), we treat Cx(·) as a function mapping In to
Γn and we call it a codeword, whose block length (or code length) M(n) equals |In|. Since the elements in
In serve as indices of block locations of a codeword, it is often assumed that In = {0, 1, . . . ,M(n) − 1} so
that each element of In can be expressed in ⌈log2M(n)⌉ bits. For convenience, we also identify Cx with
the vector (Cx(0), Cx(1), · · · , Cx(M(n)− 1)) in the ambient space (Γn)M(n) of dimension M(n). Because we
mainly work on a finite field, we often regard Γn as a finite field Fq(n) of order q(n).
The rate of a code C is defined to be the ratio n/M(n). The (Hamming) distance d(Cx, Cy) between two
codewords Cx and Cy is the number of non-zero components in the vector Cx − Cy. The minimal distance
d(C(n)) (or d(n), in short) of the codes of message length n is the smallest distance between any pair of
distinct codewords associated with the messages of length n. In contrast, ∆(Cx, Cy) denotes the relative
‡This parameter is also known as the dimension or information length of a code.
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(Hamming) distance d(Cx, Cy)/M(n). The above-described code is simply called an (M(n), n)q(n)-code
§ (or
(M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code, to emphasize the minimal distance d(n) of the code of message length n). For
readability, we often drop a length parameter n from both subscripts and argument places whenever we
discuss a set of codewords of a “fixed” message length n. A linear (M(n), n)q(n)-code forms a n-dimensional
vector space in
(
Fq(n)
)M(n)
.
Hadamard Codes HAD. Let n be any message length used as a parameter, and let q be any prime number.
A q-ary Hadamard code family HAD(q) = {HAD(q,n)}n∈N consists of all (qn, n, qn− qn−1)q-codes HAD(q,n) :
(Fq)n × (Fq)n → Fq obtained as follows. For each message x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) in (Fq)n, HAD(q,n)(x, r)
equals
∑n
i=1 xiri mod q, where r = (r1, r2, . . . , rn) is in the index set (Fq)
n.
(Normalized) Generalized Reed-Solomon Codes GRS. Let q be any prime number and let k and n be any
two positive integers satisfying that n ≤ k ≤ q. A (normalized) generalized Reed-Solomon code family
GRS = {GRS(k,n,q)}n,k∈N consists of all (k, n, k−n+1)q-codes defined as follows. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈
(Fq)n be any message and let Dk be a fixed set of k distinct elements (called code locators) in Fq. Let
GRS(k,n,q) : (Fq)n ×Dk → Fq be defined as GRS(k,n,q)(x, r) =
∑n
i=1 xir
i−1 mod q, which is a polynomial of
degree at most n− 1 with r ∈ Dk. Occasionally, we expand the domain Dk of GRS(k,n,q)x to the entire field
Fq.
2.2 Quantumly Corrupted Codewords and Codeword Presence
A quantum bit (or a qubit, in short) is a unit vector in the complex space C2, and a quantum state is
generally a tensor product of some of these qubits. To express such a quantum state, we customarily use
Dirac’s notation. For instance, a quantum state |φ〉 of two qubits can be expressed as |φ1〉⊗ |φ1〉, where |φ1〉
and |φ2〉 are both qubits; however, we often abbreviate |φ1〉 ⊗ |φ2〉 as |φ1〉|φ2〉. An execution of a quantum
algorithm on an input instance corresponds to a series of applications of unitary operations, and it is usually
modeled by a “computation” of a quantum Turing machine (Bernstein and Vazirani [2]; Yamakami [25, 26])
or a quantum circuit (Yao [27]). We use the notation A(x) (or more formally, A|x〉) to denote a quantum
state obtained after executing quantum algorithm A on classical input x (which is formally given in the
form of quantum state |x〉). When we refer to an output of A on x, we mean a classical string that is
obtained by measuring (or observing) the quantum state A(x) in the standard computational basis, where a
measurement is a projection onto a certain Hilbert space. For simplicity, we say that a quantum algorithm
runs in polynomial time if its corresponding quantum Turing machine halts within time polynomial in the
length of each input. Similar to the complexity classes P and NP, BQP denotes the collection of all (classical)
decision problems that can be solved by quantum algorithms in polynomial time with success probability
at least 2/3. For more details on quantum computation, the reader may refer to, e.g., Nielsen and Chuang
[16].
Let us consider a quantum procedure that tries to encode a classical message into its codeword. In
general, a quantum computation tends to interact with an outside system of a currently operating quantum
system, causing a quantum corruption of the computation. Hence, our process of quantum encoding may be
corrupted. A corrupted process of such quantum encoding can be described as an application of a certain
form of unitary operator. As noted before, when q(n) is a prime number, we represent each element in Fq(n) as
an integer in [0, q(n)−1]Z, which is further expressed in binary. In their 2006 conference paper, Kawachi and
Yamakami coined the terminology—a quantum-computationally corrupted codeword or quantumly corrupted
codeword—to describe such a unitary operator O, with two fixed parameter functions ℓ(n) andm(n) mapping
N to N, that satisfies the following condition: for any two strings r ∈ In and s ∈ {0, 1}m(n) and any number
ℓ(n), there exists a quantum state |φr,z〉 of ℓ(n) qubits such that
O|r〉|s〉|0ℓ(n)〉 =
∑
z∈{0,1}m(n)
αr,z|r〉|s ⊕ z〉|φr,z〉, (1)
where the notation ⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR, |φr,z〉 indicates garbage information produced when we apply
the operator O to the three registers, and the amplitudes {αr,z}r,z satisfy that
∑
z∈{0,1}m(n) |αr,z|2 = 1 for
every index r ∈ In. Since O is a unitary operator, so is its inverse O−1. Another important notion of Kawachi
and Yamakami is “codeword presence” in O. The presence of codeword Cx in O, denoted PreO(Cx), is the
average probability of obtaining the correct values Cx(r) by a measurement over all indices r ∈ In; namely,
PreO(Cx) = (1/M(n))
∑
r∈In |αr,Cx(r)|2.
§The reader should be aware that, in some literature, the notation (M(n),Γn)q(n) is used instead.
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2.3 Asymptotic Behaviors of Codeword Presence
The value of codeword presence is a key to the performance of a quantum list decoder. We will briefly argue
asymptotic behaviors of codeword presence for arbitrary quantumly corrupted codewords in a fashion similar
to classical cases of Guruswami, H˚astad, Sudan, and Zuckerman [8]. For this purpose, we need to expand
the existing notions of presence and (Hamming) distance of codewords in a more general fashion. Notice
that these generalized presence and distance are applied only to this subsection.
Let n be any message length and define Wn to be the set of all vectors w = (wr,z)r∈In,z∈Fq(n) ∈
[0, 1]q(n)M(n) (where each wr,z may be viewed as the probability |αr,z|2 of obtaining (r, z) after measur-
ing a quantumly corrupted codeword) satisfying the restriction that
∑
z∈[0,q(n)−1]Z wr,z = 1 for each index
r ∈ [0,M(n) − 1]Z, where M(n) = |In|. For every w ∈ Wn, it follows that
∑
r
∑
z wr,z = M(n). Next, we
consider the set Vn of all codewords (viewed as a vector) a = (ar)r∈In ∈ ([0, q(n) − 1]Z)M(n). We embed
each codeword a into Wn by the special mapping v, defined as v(a) = (δ
(a)
r,z )r∈In,z∈Fq(n) ∈ {0, 1}q(n)M(n),
where δ
(a)
r,z is 1 if a(r) = z, and 0 otherwise. Moreover, for any code (seen as a subset of Vn) C
(n), let
v(C(n)) = {v(a) | a ∈ C(n)}. Obviously, v(Vn) ⊆Wn holds.
Using the above notations, let us generalize the notions of distance and presence as follows. For any
pair v, w ∈ Wn, we define d(v, w) = M(n) − 〈v|w〉, where 〈·|·〉 denotes the standard inner product. This
generalized notion naturally expands the standard notion of the distance d(·, ·) because, for any a, b ∈ Vn,
we have
d(v(a), v(b)) =M(n)− 〈v(a)|v(b)〉) =M(n)− |{(r, z) | a(r) = b(r) = z}| = d(a, b).
Moreover, for any two vectors a ∈ Vn and w ∈ Wn, define Prew(a) = 1M(n) 〈v(a)|w〉. We then obtain
Prew(a) =
M(n)− d(v(a), w)
M(n)
=
〈v(a)|w〉
M(n)
= 1− d(v(a), w)
M(n)
.
First, we wish to obtain an asymptotic lower bound of codeword presence in terms of minimal relative
distance λ. For this purpose, we will introduce the notation QLpoly(λ) for the minimal possible “presence”
ε, with which, for an arbitrary family of block codes with minimal relative distance λ, the cardinality of all
messages having codeword presence of at least ε is polynomially bounded. More precisely, let C = {C(n)}n∈N
be any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code family and let ∆(C
(n)) = d(C(n))/M(n) express the relative distance of
C(n). For each pair w ∈ Wn and ε ∈ [0, 1], we write E(w, ε) for the set {a ∈ Vn | Prew(a) ≥ ε}. For
any function f : N → N and any number n ∈ N, the notation presence(C, f)(n) denotes min{ε ∈ R≥0 |
∀w ∈ Wn[ |E(w, ε) ∩C(n)| ≤ f(n) ]} and we set Pre(C, f) = lim supn→∞
{
presence(C,f)(n)
M(n)
}
. In addition, let
QLf(λ) = infC:∆(C)≥λ{Pre(C, f)}, where ∆(C) = lim infn→∞{∆(C(n))}. For each fixed constant c ∈ N, we
set QLpolyc (λ) = supa>0{QLf(c)a (λ)}, where f
(c)
a (n) = anc for any number n ∈ N. Finally, QLpoly(λ) is set
to be lim supc→∞{QLpolyc (λ)}.
Proposition 2 Let c be any positive constant and let λ be any number in [0, 1], representing a minimal
relative distance. It holds that either QLpolyc (λ) ≥ 1/q + (1 − 1/q) (1− λ/(1− 1/q) + λ/anc(1 − 1/q))1/2 or
QLpolyc (λ) ≥ 1/q+(1−1/q) (1− λ/(1 − 1/q))1/2. Therefore, QLpoly(λ) ≥ 1/q+(1−1/q) (1− λ(1 − 1/q))1/2
follows.
In certain extreme cases, it holds that QLpoly(0) = 1 and QLpoly(1) ≥
√
1/q+(1−
√
1/q)/q. It remains
open whether the equality QLpoly(λ) = 1/q + (1− 1/q) (1− λ(1 − 1/q))1/2 holds or not.
Next, we will show an asymptotic upper bound of codeword presence, particularly, in terms of the rate of
a “linear” (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code family C = {C(n)}n∈N. For convenience, we write rate(C(n)) for the code
rate n/M(n) of C(n). Here, let R be any code rate in [0, 1] and let f : N → N be any function. We define
QUf(R) = supC:rate(C)≥R{Pre(C, f)}, where rate(C) = lim infn→∞{rate(C(n))}. With this notation, for
each constant c > 0, we write QU constc (R) for QUfc(R), where fc is a constant function defined as fc(n) = c
for all numbers n ∈ N. Define QU const(R) to be lim supc→∞{QU constc (R)}.
Proposition 3 Fix an odd prime number q. For every constant c ∈ N+ with c > 2(q − 1) and every code
rate R ∈ (0, 1), it holds that QU constc (R) ≥ 1− q−
(1+2R)c−q
(q−2)c . Therefore, QU const(R) ≥ 1− q− 1+2Rq−2 follows.
For readability, we place the proofs of Propositions 2–3 in Appendix.
5
2.4 Kawachi-Yamakami Implicit-Input Explicit-Output Model
To formulate the notion of quantum list decoding, this paper deals with a specific model in which we implicitly
take a quantumly corrupted codeword as a form of “oracle” and then we output a list of messages explicitly
after accessing the oracle by way of oracle queries. A process of making an oracle query and then receiving
its oracle answer is conventionally assumed to take a unit time. Upon this implicit-input explicit-output
model, the quantum list-decoding problem (QLDP) for a classical block code family C can be described as
follows. First, let C = {C(n)}n∈N be any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code family with message space Σn and let O
be any set of quantumly corrupted codewords for C. Taking a bias parameter ε : N → [0, 1], we define the
ε-QLDP as:
ε-Quantum List Decoding Problem (ε-QLDP) for Code Family C with respect to O
◦ Input: a message length n and a value 1/ε(n) > 0.
◦ Implicit Input: an oracle O ∈ O representing a quantumly corrupted codeword for C(n).
◦ Output: a list of messages including all messages x ∈ Σn that satisfy the inequality PreO(Cx) ≥
1/q(n) + ε(n). For convenience, we refer to such a list as a valid list for the ε-QLDP.
Our goal is to solve the problem ε-QLDP for C using an efficient quantum algorithm that makes an oracle
access to a given quantumly corrupted codeword in O with success probability at least δ(n), which is given
as a confidence parameter. Here, let us formally introduce the notion of a quantum list-decoding algorithm
(or simply, a quantum list decoder) that works with two parameters: bias ε and confidence δ.
Definition 4 (quantum list decoding) Let C be any code family, let ε(n) be any bias parameter, and let
δ(n) be any confidence parameter. A quantum list-decoding algorithm (or a quantum list decoder) for C with
bias ε and confidence δ is a quantum algorithm A that solves the ε-QLDP for C with success probability at
least δ(n). If A further runs in time polynomial in (n, 1/ε(n), 1/δ(n)), it is called a polynomial-time quantum
list-decoding algorithm for C.
The list size of a quantum list decoder with respect to input size n refers to the maximal size of any valid
list produced by the algorithm on any input of size n. In certain applications, the list size of a single valid
list plays a crucial role; for instance, when a quantum list decoder produces only a single valid list L (along
all measured outcomes) with probability at least δ(n), certain “advice” of size ⌈log|Σ| |L|⌉ over a message
alphabet Σ may help specify a hidden message x uniquely with the same success probability.
A close connection between quantum list decoding and (strongly) quantum one-way functions was ex-
hibited by Kawachi and Yamakami [13]. The rest of this subsection briefly discusses a further relationship
between quantum list decoding and a restricted form of quantum one-way functions, called quantum super
one-way functions, which can be seen as a natural extension of quantum one-way permutations.
Definition 5 (quantum super one-wayness) Let f be any function mapping Σ∗ to Σ∗ with length
function ℓ : N → N, that is, |f(x)| = ℓ(|x|) for every x. This function f is called quantum super one-
way if (i) there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A such that, for every input x of length n,
A|x〉|0ℓ(n)〉|0e(n)〉 = |x〉|f(x)〉|φx〉 holds for a certain unit-norm quantum state |φx〉 of e(n) qubits and (ii) for
any positive polynomial p and any polynomial-time quantum algorithm B, the probability that B on input
|1n〉|f(x)〉|φx〉 outputs x of length n is at most 1/p(n) for all but finitely many strings x.
In comparison with Definition 5, the quantum one-wayness formulated by Kawachi and Yamakami [13]
requires that B|f(x)〉 outputs x only with negligible probability whereby the information |φx〉 is hidden from
the adversary B who tries to invert f . Definition 5, on the contrary, indicates that B cannot output x
with non-negligible probability even though |φx〉 is given to B besides f(x) as supplemental information. In
computational cryptography, this notion naturally arises. A typical example of super one-way function is
a quantum one-way permutation obtained by replacing further the quantum state |φx〉 in Definition 5 with
|0m〉, which is obtained, for example, by uncomputing a deterministic procedure that computes f(x) from
x.
In what follows, for any index i, the notation (f(x))i denotes the ith bit of the value f(x) whenever
1 ≤ i ≤ |f(x)|.
Lemma 6 Let f be any quantum super one-way function with its length function m(n) ∈ nO(1)
(i.e., |f(x)| = m(|x|)). Consider an (m(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code C whose codeword Cx(r) is (f(x))r. For
every positive polynomial p, this code C cannot be polynomial-time quantum list decodable with confidence
1/p(n).
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Proof. Let f be a quantum super one-way function with its length function m(n), where m(n) is
polynomially bounded, and consider an (m(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code C satisfying Cx(r) = (f(x))r for any x and
r. Since a certain polynomial-time quantum algorithm must compute f exactly as stated in Definition 5,
by modifying this algorithm slightly, we obtain another polynomial-time quantum algorithm, say, A that
computes C(x, r). Without loss of generality, we may assume that, for every n ∈ N+, every x ∈ Σn, and
every r ∈ [ℓ(n)], A|x〉|r〉|0〉|0e(n)〉 = |x〉|r〉|Cx(r)〉|φx〉 holds for a certain quantum state |φx〉 that depends
only on x. Here, we fix x of length n arbitrarily and define Ox|r〉|s〉|0e(n)〉 = |r〉|s⊕Cx(r)〉|φx〉 for any strings
r and s. Notice that PreOx(Cx) = 1 holds. Toward a contradiction, assume that C has a polynomial-time
quantum list decoder B such that, since the presence of Cx in Ox is 1, B on input 1n produces the hidden
string x with probability at least 1/p(n) for a certain fixed positive polynomial p, where “1n” indicates an
input representing “n” in the definition of the ε-QLDP. We want to invert f in polynomial time. For this
goal, we define a quantum algorithm D as follows.
On input |1n〉|f(x)〉|φx〉, where n = |x|, we run the quantum list decoder B on input 1n using Ox
as an oracle. However, whenever B makes an oracle query |r〉|s〉|t〉 to the oracle Ox, we simulate
the behavior of Ox as follows. We generate an oracle answer |r〉|s ⊕ (f(x))r〉|φx〉 directly using
the input information. Finally, we output an outcome of B. Since PreOx(Cx) = 1, the outcome
of B must be x itself.
The above algorithm D thus inverts f correctly with probability at least 1/p(n). This implies that f cannot
be quantum super one-way, a contradiction against our assumption. Therefore, C is not polynomial-time
quantum list decodable with confidence 1/p(n). ✷
3 Codes of Polynomially Small Rate
The proof of our main theorem (Theorem 1) requires a suitable code family of polynomially small code rate
over a fixed code alphabet. Such a code family can be obtained by Forney’s [5] idea of concatenating two
appropriate code families. In Section 3.1, we will claim that this concatenated code family is efficiently
quantumly list decodable for a certain choice of code parameters. This claim—Theorem 7—then leads to
the main theorem. Therefore, our primary goal is to conduct necessary ground work that leads to the proof
of Theorem 7. For the sake of readability, we will split the proof into two claims—Proposition 8 and Lemma
11—and this section will prove only the proposition, leaving the lemma to Section 4. A key proof technique
of this section in handling the concatenated code is a quantum reduction between two quantumly corrupted
codewords, maintaining “similar” codeword presence values.
3.1 Concatenated Codes
A typical way to build a family of classical block codes that have desired code rate and desired code alphabet
size is to compose two appropriate block codes with certain necessary code properties. This is Forney’s [5]
novel method of creating so-called concatenated codes. In our case, concatenating an appropriate generalized
Reed-Solomon code with its matching Hadamard code, we can build a code of polynomially small code rate
and constant code alphabet size. For such a code family, we will prove its efficient quantum list decodability,
provided that the generalized Reed-Solomon codes have efficient quantum list decoders.
More formally, let us consider two block codes C1 and C2 such that C1 is an (M1, n1, d1)qn2 -code and C2
is an (M2, n2, d2)q-code. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn1) be any message of length n1, where each entry xi is taken
from Σn2 over a q-letter alphabet Σ. Since xi can be expressed as an n2-letter string, x can be viewed as a
string of total length n1n2 over Σ. By taking the inner code C2 concatenated with the outer code C1, the
concatenated code C = C2 ⊙C1 is defined as C(x, r, s) = C2(C1(x, r), s) for every triplet (x, r, s). This code
C becomes an (M1M2, n1n2, d)q-code with d satisfying d ≥ d1d2, where d1d2 is called the design distance.
For our purpose of this section, we choose the concatenated code CGRS-H [n, q, θ] given by Guruswami
and Sudan [10]. This concatenated code is obtained from a certain generalized Reed-Solomon code used as
an outer code together with an appropriate Hadamard code used as an inner code. Following Guruswami
and Sudan [10], here we choose three parameters (n, q, θ) with n, q ∈ N and θ ∈ [0, 1] that satisfy n ≥ 1,
q ≥ 2, n = mqmθ, and qmθ ∈ N for a certain number m ∈ N. In what follows, we freely identify elements in
(Fq)n with elements in Fqn in the standard fashion.
Concatenated Code CGRS-H [n, q, θ]. The concatenated code CGRS-H [n, q, θ] is defined by CGRS-H [n, q, θ] =
HAD(q,m) ⊙ GRS(qm,qmθ,qm). This is a (q2m, n, d)q-code, where n = mqmθ and d ≥ (1 − 1/q)(1 − θ)q2m
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(design distance). From n = mqmθ, we obtain logn = logmqmθ, from which m = logn−logm+log(1/θ)log q
follows. This implies log(1/θ)log q ≤ m ≤ n; thus, qm = nmθ ≤ n log qθ log(1/θ) . As long as q is fixed and θ = Ω(1/nk)
holds for a certain constant k ∈ N+, qm is upper-bounded by O(nk+1/ logn). Hence, the code rate n/q2m is
lower-bounded by c log nnk for a certain constant c > 0.
This concatenated code family CGRS-H = {CGRS-H [n, q, θ]}n,q,θ is proven by Guruswami and Sudan [10]
to be efficiently classically list decodable; that is, there exists a polynomial-time probabilistic algorithm that
produces, from any classically corrupted codeword (or conventionally, a received word) w, a list containing
all messages x whose codewords are all at distance close to w. To prove Theorem 1, it therefore suffices to
show that the code family CGRS-H is also quantumly list decodable in an efficient manner for appropriately
chosen parameters. In a more general fashion, we intend to show the following statement. Let T denote the
collection of all tuples (n,m, q, θ) such that m, q,∈ N+, q ≥ 2, θ ∈ [0, 1], qmθ ∈ N, and n = mqmθ.
Theorem 7 For each n ∈ N+, assume that a parameter tuple (m, q, θ, ε, δ) satisfies the following conditions:
(n,m, q, θ) ∈ T , ε, δ ∈ [0, 1], 2(1 − 1/q)2(1/M + ε′) < ε2, and 2(1 − 1/q)2(1 − 1/M − ε′)
√
∆
1+Mε′ < ε
2 for
a certain ε′ ∈ (0, 1), where M = qm and ∆ = 2(n − 1) log(M2/(1 − δ)). The concatenated code family
CGRS-H = {CGRS-H [n, q, θ]}n,q,θ with the above conditions has a quantum list decoder with bias ε and
confidence δ running in time polynomial in (n, q, 1/ε, 1/δ, 1/(1− δ)).
Here, we give the proof of Theorem 1 using Theorem 7. Although it is possible to relax the conditions
stated in Theorem 7 further, they are sufficient to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix a prime number q, a constant k ∈ N+, and a confidence parameter δ. Here,
we set ε = 1/nk. We also choose other parameters (n,m, q, θ) ∈ T and M = qm = O(nℓ) ∩ Ω(n8k+4)
for a certain fixed constant ℓ ≥ 8k + 4 and consider the code CGRS-H [n, q, θ]. In this case, it holds that
θ = n/mM = Ω(1/nℓ−1) since m = logM/ log q. This guarantees the polynomially small code rate of C. Let
us define t(n) =M2. Note that the value ∆ = 2(n− 1) log(M2/(1− δ)) satisfies ∆ = O(n log n) = O(n1.4).
For simplicity, set α = 1/M + ε′. Now, defining ε′ =
√
1/M , we obtain Mα = 1+
√
M = Ω(n4k+2). It thus
follows that 2(1 − α)
√
∆
Mα = O(n
0.7/n2k+1). Since ε = 1/nk, we obtain 2(1 − α)
√
∆
Mα < ε
2 and 2α < ε2
for any sufficiently large n. Since all premises of Theorem 7 are fulfilled, there must exist a quantum list
decoder with bias ε and confidence δ. This quantum list decoder runs in time polynomial in n since the
parameters (q, δ) are constants. This completes the proof. ✷
Let us return to Theorem 7. This theorem, in fact, follows from two technical claims: Proposi-
tion 8 and Lemma 11. We will prove in Proposition 8 that the concatenated code family CGRS-H =
{CGRS-H [n, q, θ]}n,q,θ has a polynomial-time quantum list decoder for an appropriate choice of three param-
eters (n, q, θ), assuming that the generalized Reed-Solomon codes are quantum list decodable in polynomial
time. This last assumption will be later eliminated, in Lemma 11, completing the proof of Theorem 7.
Proposition 8 For each n ∈ N+, let (q, θ,m, ε, ε′, δ) satisfy the following conditions: (n,m, q, θ) ∈ T ,
ε, ε′, δ ∈ [0, 1], and ε2 ≥ (1−1/q)2(1/M+ε′). If the (M,Mθ, (1−θ)M +1)M -generalized Reed-Solomon code
has a quantum list decoder with bias ε′ and confidence δ running in time polynomial in (n, q, 1/ε′, 1/δ, 1/θ),
where M = qm, then CGRS-H [n, q, θ] has a quantum list decoder with bias ε and confidence δ running in
time polynomial in (n, q, 1/ε′, 1/δ, 1/θ).
Note that the confidence δ for the GRS-code in Proposition 8 is carried over to the confidence for the
concatenated code CGRS-H [n, q, θ]. The proposition is an important ingredient of Theorem 7 and its proof
will be given in the subsequent subsection.
3.2 A Quantum Reduction Technique
Aiming at proving Proposition 8, we wish to construct a “quantum reduction” between two quantumly
corrupted codewords. Such a reduction, say, from O to O′ can be described as a quantum algorithm that,
on input of the form |r〉|s〉|t〉, computes the outcome O′|r〉|s〉|t〉 by invoking a number of oracle calls to O as
well as O−1. This can be seen as a strong form of well-known Turing reduction between two languages.
Here, let C be any (qm, n/m)qm -code, which is, as before, treated as a function C(x, r) mapping from
(Fq)
n
m × Fqm to Fqm whenever n/m ∈ N+. Recall that we freely identify (Fq)m with Fqm . As a technical
lemma essential for the proof of Proposition 8, we will show a general result concerning a concatenated code
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D = HAD(q,m) ⊙C. Since the q-ary Hadamard code HAD(q,m) is used as an inner code, we can rephrase D
as
D(x, r, s) = C(x, r) · s mod q
for any r, s ∈ Fqm and any x ∈ (Fqm)n.
In what follows, let us aim at constructing a quantum reduction between quantumly corrupted codewords
OC and OD associated with the codes C and D, respectively. For convenience, we introduce new terminology.
For any unitary transform U , we say that a quantum algorithm A realizes U if, for any basis quantum state
|r〉, A on input |r〉 exactly produces the quantum state U |r〉. This notion will help describe a quantum
reduction from OC to OD.
Lemma 9 Let C and D be the codes given as above. For any quantumly corrupted codeword OC for C,
there exist a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A and a quantumly corrupted codeword OD for D such that
1. PreOD (Dx) = 1/q + (1− 1/q) PreOC (Cx); and
2. A realizes OD with one oracle access to OC .
For the proof of Proposition 8, we need to weaken the notions of “quantumly corrupted codeword” and
“realization.” A generalized quantumly corrupted codeword O is defined by Eq.(1) except that we require
only the inequality
∑
z |αr,z|2 ≤ 1 among the amplitudes {αr,z}r,z. The codeword presence of Cx in each
of the operators Ok is defined as before. Let O = {Ok}k∈[q−1] denote a series of generalized quantumly
corrupted codewords. For this series O, we also define the average (codeword) presence avPreO(Cx) of Cx in
O to be (1/(q − 1))∑k∈[q−1] PreOk(Cx). For a series U = {Uk}k∈[q−1] of unitary operations, we say that a
quantum algorithm A weakly realizes U if A on input |k〉|r〉|0〉 generates a certain quantum state and, after
tracing out the third register by the observable |0〉, it becomes |k〉 ⊗ Uk|r〉.
Lemma 10 Let C and D be the codes given as above. For any quantumly corrupted codeword OD for
D, then there exist a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A and a series O = {Ok}k∈[q−1] of generalized
quantumly corrupted codewords for C such that
1. avPreO(Cx) ≥ (q/(q − 1))2(PreOD (Dx)− 1/q)2; and
2. A weakly realizes O with one oracle access to each of OD and O−1D .
Lemma 10 gives a fast quantum reduction from OD to OC . From this lemma directly follows Proposition
8. Before proving Lemmas 9–10, we briefly describe the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 8. Let n ∈ N+ be any length parameter and assume that all other parameters
(m, q, θ, ε, ε′, δ) satisfy the premise of the proposition. Hereafter, we set M = qm and D = CGRS-H [n, q, θ]
for brevity. Let us assume that the (M,Mθ, (1−θ)M+1)M-generalized Reed-Solomon code has a polynomial-
time quantum list decoder, say, A with bias ε′ and confidence δ. Take any quantumly corrupted codeword
O for D. Our goal here is to find from O all messages x that satisfy the inequality PreO(Cx) ≥ 1/q + ε in
time polynomial in (n, q, 1/ε′, 1/δ, 1/θ) with confidence δ.
Since D = HAD(q,m) ⊙GRS(M,Mθ,M), Lemma 10 helps reduce O to a series O′ = {O′k}k∈[q−1] of gener-
alized quantumly corrupted codewords for the outer code GRS(M,Mθ,M) so that O′ can be weakly realized
by a certain polynomial-time quantum algorithm, say, B with the following average presence condition:
avPreO′
(
GRS(M,Mθ,M)x
)
≥
(
q
q − 1
)2(
PreO(Dx)− 1
q
)2
≥
(
q
q − 1
)2
ε2 ≥ 1
M
+ ε′,
where the last inequality follows directly from the bound ε2 ≥ (1 − 1/q)2(1/M + ε′), which is given as
a part of the premise of the proposition. In other words, the average value of PreO′
k
(GRS(M,Mθ,M)x ) over
all k ∈ [q − 1] is lower-bounded by 1/M + ε′. Thus, we can choose an index k0 ∈ [q − 1] for which
PreO′
k
(GRS(M,Mθ,M)x ) ≥ 1/M + ε′. By our assumption, for this k0, A correctly produces a list including all
messages x satisfying PreO′
k
(GRS(M,Mθ,M)x ) ≥ 1/M + ε′ with confidence δ.
Let us consider the following quantum algorithm, which uses A and B as subroutines.
On input, we first set k = 0 and, by incrementing k by one, we inductively run the quantum list
decoder A with O′k as an oracle to produce a list of message candidates. During inductive steps,
we always append new candidates to the existing list. Whenever a query is made, we run B to
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generate its oracle answer. This is possible because B weakly realizes O′. Eventually, we reach k0
and we then obtain a list containing of all messages x satisfying PreO′(GRS
(M,Mθ,M)
x ) ≥ 1/M+ε′
with probability at least δ.
This algorithm is obviously a quantum list decoder and it produces with confidence δ a list that contains
all messages x satisfying PreO(Dx) ≥ 1/q + ε. This completes the proof. ✷
Next, we want to prove Lemmas 9–10. We begin with the proof of Lemma 10.
Proof of Lemma 10. Let C be any (qm, n/m)qm -code. We denote byD the concatenated code HAD
(q,m)⊙
C and assume that OD satisfies OD|r, s〉|u〉|0ℓ(n)〉 =
∑
z∈Fq αr,s,z|r, s〉|u⊕ z〉|φr,s,z〉 for any r, s ∈ Fqm , where
ℓ(n) indicates the size of garbage information |φr,s,z〉. Note that PreOD (Dx) = q−2m
∑
r,s∈Fqm |αr,s,Dx(r,s)|2
and that
∑
z∈Fq |αr,s,z |2 = 1 for every pair (r, s).
We wish to define the desired quantum algorithm A and the desired series O = {Ok}k of generalized
quantumly corrupted codewords that can be weakly realized by A using OD as an oracle. To describe the
algorithm A, we utilize a special unitary transform U over [q−1] acting as U |0〉 = (1/√q − 1)∑k∈[q−1] |k〉 as
well as a quantum Fourier transform Fq over Fq that acts as Fq|s〉 = q−1/2
∑
w∈Fq ω
s·w
q |w〉 for any s ∈ Fq. It
was proven by van Dam, Hallgren, and Ip [23] that Fq can be approximated to within error η on a quantum
computer in time polynomial in (log q, log(1/η)).
Quantum Algorithm A:
(1) Start with an initial quantum state |ψ1〉 = |k〉|r〉|0m〉|0〉|0ℓ〉.
(2) By applying the quantum Fourier transform (Fq)
m to the third register, we generate the quantum state
|ψ2〉 = q−m/2
∑
s∈(Fq)m |k〉|r, s〉|0〉|0ℓ〉, where |r, s〉 is a shorthand for |r〉|s〉.
(3) Apply OD to the last three registers. This step transforms the quantum state |ψ2〉 into |ψ3〉 =
q−m/2
∑
s∈(Fq)m
∑
z∈Fq αr,s,z|k〉|r, s〉|z〉|φr,s,z〉.
(4) Apply the phase encoding of Kawachi and Yamakami [13]; that is, encode the content of
the fourth register into the “phase” together with the information on k to obtain |ψ4〉 =
q−m/2
∑
s∈(Fq)m
∑
z∈Fq ω
k·z
q αr,s,z|k〉|r, s〉|z〉|φr,s,z〉.
(5) Apply O−1D , the inverse of OD, to the last four registers. The resulted state |ψ5〉 can be expressed as∑
s∈(F−q)m
∑
z∈Fq βk,r,s,z |k〉|r, s〉|0〉|0ℓ〉+ |k〉|∆k,r〉 with certain amplitudes βk,r,s,z and a certain vector
|∆k,r〉 whose last two registers does not contain the term |0〉|0ℓ〉. Each amplitude βk,r,s,z is calculated
as
βk,r,s,z = 〈k|〈r|〈s|〈0|〈0ℓ|I ⊗O−1D |ψk〉 =
1
qm/2
ωk·zq |αr,s,z|2,
where I is the identity transform. The quantum state |ψ5〉 is thus written in the form
1
qm/2
∑
s∈(Fq)m
∑
z∈Fq
ωk·zq |αr,s,z |2|k〉|r〉|s〉|0〉|0ℓ〉+ |k〉|∆k,r〉.
(6) Focusing on the last two registers, if they contain |0〉|0ℓ〉, then we multiply the content s of the third
register by k to obtain k · s (seen as a scalar multiplication of a vector); otherwise, do nothing. Note
that k · s is in (Fq)m since s ∈ (Fq)m and k ∈ Fq. Let |ψ6〉 denote the obtained quantum state.
(7) Similarly, whenever |0〉|0ℓ〉 appears in the last two registers, apply the inverse of the quantum
Fourier transform (F−1q )
m to the third register. This transform produces the quantum state |ψ7〉 =∑
w∈(Fq)m γk,r,w|k〉|r〉|w〉|0〉|0ℓ〉+ |k〉|∆k,r〉, where γk,r,w is a complex number given as
γk,r,w = 〈r|〈w|〈0|〈0ℓ|(F |ψ6〉) = 1
qm
∑
s∈(Fq)m
∑
z∈Fq
ωk(z−w·s)q |αr,s,z|2,
where F = I ⊗ I ⊗ (F−1q )m ⊗ I.
(8) Observe the last register in state |0〉|0ℓ〉 and discard the term |∆k,r〉. Finally, output the final quantum
state |ψ8〉 =
∑
w∈(Fq)m γk,r,w|k〉|r〉|w〉. This finishes the description of A.
We define O = {Ok}k∈[q−1], where each Ok is a generalized quantumly corrupted codeword that is
realized by A with |k〉 in the first register.
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To complete the proof, we need to estimate the average presence avPreO(Cx) of Cx in O. For each
index k ∈ [q − 1], the presence of Cx in Ok is exactly PreOk(Cx) = q−m
∑
r∈Fqm |γk,r,Cx(r)|2, which equals
q−m
∑
r∈Fq
∣∣∣q−m∑s∑z ωk(z−w·s)q |αr,s,z|2∣∣∣2. It thus follows that
avPreO(Cx) =
1
q − 1
∑
k∈[q−1]
1
qm
∑
r∈Fqm
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
qm
∑
z∈Fq
∑
s∈(Fq)m
ωk(z−Dx(r,s))q |αr,s,Dx(r,s)|2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
qm(q − 1)
∑
k
∑
r
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈Fq
ωk·jq
(
1
qm
∑
s
|αr,s,Dx(r,s)+j |2
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≥ 1
q2m(q − 1)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k
∑
r
∑
j∈Fq
ωk·jq
(
1
qm
∑
s
|αr,s,Dx(r,s)+j |2
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
where the last inequality follows from
∑n
i=1 a
2
i ≥ 1n (
∑n
i=1 ai)
2
. We therefore obtain
avPreO(Cx) ≥ 1
(q − 1)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈[q−1]
∑
j∈Fq
ωk·jq

 1
q2m
∑
r∈Fq
∑
s∈(Fq)m
|αr,s,Dx(r,s)+j |2


∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
For each index j ∈ Fq, we write βj for q−2m
∑
r
∑
s |αr,s,Dx(r,s)+j|2. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.5 of
Kawachi and Yamakami [13], we can derive
avPreO(Cx) ≥ 1
(q − 1)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈[q−1]
β0 +
∑
1≤j<q

 ∑
k∈[q−1]
ωk·jq

 βj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
(q − 1)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣(q − 1)β0 −
∑
1≤j<q
βj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
(q − 1)2 |qβ0 − 1|
2
,
because
∑
j∈Fq βj = 1 and
∑
k∈Fq ω
k·j
q = 0 for any j 6= 0. Since PreOD (Dx) =
q−2m
∑
r,s∈(Fq)m |αr,s,Dx(r,s)|2 = β0, it follows that
avPreO(Cx) ≥ 1
(q − 1)2 |q · PreO(Dx)− 1|
2 =
(
q
q − 1
)2(
PreOD (Dx)−
1
q
)2
.
This completes the proof of Lemma 10. ✷
Next, we give the remaining proof of Lemma 9.
Proof of Lemma 9. Recall that D = HAD(q,m) ⊙ C for a given (qm, n/m)qm-code C, provided that
n/m ∈ N+. Regarding this code C, a quantumly corrupted codeword OC is assumed to act as OC |r〉|0〉|0d〉 =∑
z∈Fqm αr,z|r〉|z〉|φr,z〉. Using this OC as an oracle, let us consider a polynomial-time quantum algorithm
A defined below. Let e be the size of garbage qubits produced in the description of A.
Quantum Algorithm A:
(1) Start with the quantum state |ψ1〉 = |r〉|s〉|0〉|0d〉|0e〉, where r, s ∈ Fqm .
(2) Change the register order to obtain the quantum state |ψ2〉 = |r〉|0〉|0d〉|s〉|0e〉.
(3) Invoke OC using the first three registers and obtain the quantum state |ψ3〉 =∑
z∈Fqm αr,z|r〉|z〉|φr,z〉|s〉|0e〉.
(4) Compute the value u = z · s mod q in a reversible fashion from (s, z). We then obtain the quantum
state |ψ4〉 =
∑
z∈Fqm αr,z|r〉|z〉|φr,z〉|s〉|u〉|φ′s,z〉, where |φ′s,z〉 indicates a certain garbage that might be
produced while reversing the computation for u on a quantum computer.
(5) Again, change the register order so that we obtain the quantum state |ψ5〉 =
∑
z∈Fqm αr,z|r〉|s〉|z ·
s mod q〉|z〉|φr,z〉|φ′s,z〉. Finally, output |ψ5〉.
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The desired quantumly corrupted codeword O for D is defined as
O|r〉|s〉|0l〉|0d〉|0e〉 =
∑
z∈Fqm
αr,z |r〉|s〉|z · s mod q〉|z〉|φr,z〉|φ′s,z〉
=
∑
w∈Fq
|r〉|s〉|w〉 ⊗

 ∑
z∈As(w)
αr,z |z〉|φˆr,s,z〉

 ,
where |φˆr,s,z〉 = |φr,z〉|φ′s,z〉 and As(a) = {z ∈ Fqm | z · s ≡ a mod q} for any a ∈ Fq. It is obvious that O
can be realized by A.
To end the proof, we want to show that PreO(Dx) equals 1/q + (1 − 1/q)PreOC (Cx). For convenience,
let the notation Tr for each index r ∈ Fqm express the value
∑
s∈Fqm ‖
∑
z∈As(Dx(r,s)) αr,z|z〉|φˆr,s,z〉‖2.
With this notation, the presence PreO(Dx) can be expressed as q
−m∑
r∈Fqm Tr, which equals∑
s∈Fqm
∑
z∈As(Dx(r,s)) |αr,z|2. Since the condition “z · s ≡ Dx(r, s) mod q” is equivalent to the condi-
tion “z · s ≡ Cx(r) · s mod q,” it follows that Tr =
∑
z∈Fqm
∑
s∈EQq(z,Cx(r)) |αr,z|2, where EQq(a, b) = {s ∈
Fqm | a · s ≡ b · s mod q}. We therefore derive
Tr = |EQq(Cx(r), Cx(r))| · |αr,Cx(r)|2 +
∑
z:z 6=Cx(r)
|EQq(z, Cx(r))| · |αr,z|2
= qm|αr,Cx(r)|2 + qm−1
∑
z:z 6=Cx(r)
|αr,z|2
= qm
(
1
q
+
(
1− 1
q
)
|αr,Cx(r)|2
)
,
where the second equality follows from the fact that |EQq(a, b)| = qm−1 if a 6= b. From the above relation,
we obtain
PreO(Dx) =
1
qm
∑
r∈Fqm
Tr =
1
q
+
1
qm
(
1− 1
q
) ∑
r∈Fqm
|αr,Cx(r)|2
=
1
q
+
(
1− 1
q
)
PreOC (Cx).
This completes the proof of Lemma 9. ✷
In the end, we have finished the proof of Proposition 8.
4 Complexity of Generalized Reed-Solomon Codes
We have shown in Proposition 8 that the concatenated code family CGRS-H has an efficient quantum list
decoder if the generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes are efficiently quantum list decodable. In order to
verify Theorem 7, however, it remains to claim that the GRS-codes are efficiently quantum list decodable
when the bias is relatively large. This claim will be proven as Lemma 11 in Section 4.1 in a more general
fashion. For a much smaller bias, in contrast, there seems little hope in finding an efficient quantum list
decoder, based on the common belief that NP-complete problems have no efficient quantum algorithms. In
Sections 4.2–4.3, we will further show that the GRS-codes have natural connections to the noisy polynomial
interpolation problem (NPIP) of Naor and Pinkas [15] and a lattice problem, which we call the bounded
distance vector problem (BDVP).
4.1 Polynomial Reconstruction
Proposition 8 requires the existence of efficient quantum list decodability of a family of GRS-codes. This
assumption can be removed for an appropriate choice of parameters. Now, we claim, in the following technical
lemma, that the family of GRS-codes is indeed quantumly list decodable.
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Lemma 11 For any number n ∈ N, assume that a prime number q and real numbers ε, δ ∈ (0, 1) satisfy the
following conditions: 2 ≤ n ≤ q and ε′+(1− 1/q − ε′)
√
∆
1+qε′ < ε ≤ 1−1/q for a certain number ε′ ∈ (0, 1),
where ∆ = 2(n− 1) log(q2/(1 − δ)). There exists a quantum list decoder for a (q, n, q − n+ 1)q-generalized
Reed-Solomon code with bias ε and confidence δ running in time polynomial in (n, q, 1/δ, 1/(1− δ)).
Combining Proposition 8 together with Lemma 11, Theorem 7 follows immediately. Before proving
Lemma 11, we briefly present the proof of Theorem 7, which leads to Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 7. Consider the concatenated code CGRS-H [n, q, θ] = HAD(q,m)⊙GRS(M,Mθ,M) with
parameters n, q, θ as specified in the theorem, where M = qm and n = mqmθ. The premise of the theorem
implies (
1− 1
q
)2 [
1
M
+ ε′′ +
(
1− 1
M
− ε′′
)√
∆
1 +Mε′′
]
<
ε2
2
+
ε2
2
= ε2,
which further implies ε′′ + (1− 1/M − ε′′)
√
∆/(1 +Mε′′) < q
2ε2
(q−1)2 − 1M . Now, choose an appropriate
real number ε′ ∈ (0, 1) so that (1) ε′′ + (1− 1/M − ε′′)
√
∆/(1 +Mε′′) < ε′ and (2) ε′ ≤ q2ε2(q−1)2 − 1M (or
equivalently, ε2 ≥ (1− 1/q)2 (1/M + ε′)).
From (1), Lemma 11 guarantees the existence of a quantum list decoder A for GRS(M,Mθ,M) with bias
ε′ and confidence δ running in time polynomial in (n,M, 1/δ, 1/(1 − δ)). With this quantum list decoder
together with (2), Proposition 8 provides us with the desired quantum list decoder for CGRS-H with bias ε
and confidence δ. ✷
To complete the proof of Theorem 7, what still remains to deal with is the proof of Lemma 11. A direct
use of a polynomial reconstruction algorithm of Guruswami and Sudan [9] works well to prove this lemma.
We will apply this classical algorithm after collecting enough information on possible values of a target
“polynomial” by a simple application of random sampling, that is, performing measurement on all oracle
answers.
Proof of Lemma 11. Let n be an arbitrary message length and choose four parameters q ∈ N+ and
ε, ε′, δ ∈ (0, 1) that satisfy the premise of the lemma. For simplicity, we write C for GRS(q,n,q). Let O be any
quantumly corrupted codeword for Cx, having the form O|r〉|s〉|0ℓ〉 =
∑
z∈Fq αr,z|r〉|s ⊕ z〉|φr,z〉 for certain
complex numbers αr,z and certain unit-norm quantum states |φr,z〉. Recall that the presence of Cx in O is
(1/q)
∑
r∈Fq |αr,Cx(r)|2. Here, we want to find all messages x satisfying the inequality PreO(Cx) ≥ 1/q + ε.
Fix a message x arbitrarily and omit script “x” in the following argument. Let us define two sets
Aε′ = {r ∈ Fq | |αr,Cx(r)|2 ≥ 1/q + ε′} and Dε′ = {(r, y) ∈ F2q | |αr,y|2 ≥ 1/q + ε′}. Note that Cx passes at
least |Aε′ | points in Dε′ . First, we note that |Dε′ | ≤ q2/(1 + qε′). This upper bound is easily obtained from
q2 ≥
∑
r
∑
y
|αr,y|2 ≥
∑
(r,y)∈Dε′
|αr,y|2 ≥ |Dε′ |
(
1
q
+ ε′
)
.
The assumption PreO(Cx) ≥ 1/q + ε implies
1
q
+ ε ≤ PreO(Cx) = 1
q
∑
r∈Aε′
|αr,Cx(r)|2 +
1
q
∑
r∈Fq−Aε′
|αr,Cx(r)|2
≤ |Aε′ |
q
+
q − |Aε′ |
q
(
1
q
+ ε′
)
.
This concludes that |Aε′ | ≥ (1− γε,ε′)q, where γε,ε′ = 1−1/q−ε1−1/q−ε′ .
For a later use, we set T ′ = q
2 log(q2/(1−δ))
1+qε′ . Now, we claim that (1 − γε,ε′)2q2 > 2(n − 1)T ′. This
inequality is equivalent to (ε− ε′)2 > (1− 1/q − ε′)2 ∆1+qε′ , which directly follows from our assumption that
ε > ε′ + (1 − 1/q − ε′)
√
∆/(1 + qε′), where ∆ = 2(n − 1) log(q2/(1 − δ)). Let us consider the following
quantum algorithm.
Initially, from the quantum state |0〉|0〉|0〉, we generate |ψ0〉 = (1/√q)
∑
r∈Fq |r〉|0〉|0〉. By making a query
to oracle O, we generate |ψ1〉 = (1/√q)
∑
r
∑
y αr,y|r〉|y〉|φy〉. Next, we measure the first two registers and
obtain (r, y) with probability |αr,y|2/q. Let us repeat these steps exactly T times, where T is the minimal
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positive integer satisfying 2T ′ ≥ T ≥ T ′. Since T ≥ T ′, we obtain
T ≥ q
2 log(q2/(1− δ))
1 + qε′
≥ log (1 + qε
′) (1− δ) /q2
log (1− 1/q2 − ε′/q) , (2)
where we use inequalities: log(1− z) < −z and 1+ qε′ ≥ 1. After receiving each answer from O, we perform
a measurement in the computational basis over Fq × Fq and store a point (r, y) that is a result of this
measurement.
Let Sε′ indicate the set of all the obtained points. Clearly, |Sε′ | ≤ T holds. Note that, with probability
(1 − |αr,y|2/q)T , each point (r, y) is never observed during the procedure. Hence, the probability P of
obtaining all (r, y)’s in Dε′ is lower-bounded by
P ≥ 1−
∑
(r,y)∈Dε′
(
1− |αr,y|
2
q
)T
≥ 1− q
2
1 + qε′
·
(
1− 1
q2
− ε
′
q
)T
≥ δ,
where the last inequality follows from Eq.(2). Therefore, the probability that Sε′ includes Dε′ is at least δ.
Lastly, we wish to find all univariate polynomials p of degree at most n−1 that lie on at least |Aε′ | points
in Sε′ . For this purpose, we run the well-known Guruswami-Sudan polynomial reconstruction algorithm.
Earlier, Guruswami and Sudan [9] described a deterministic algorithm A that solves in time polynomial in
(m, log q) the following polynomial reconstruction problem.
Polynomial Reconstruction Problem
◦ Input: three positive integers m′, n′, t and m′ points {(xi, yi)}i∈[m′] ⊆ Fq × Fq.
◦ Output: all univariate polynomials p of degree at most n′ that lie on at least t points, provided that
t >
√
m′n′.
To apply the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm to our case, letting n′ = n− 1, m′ = |Sε′ |, and t = |Aε′ |, we
should demand the requirement that |Aε′ | >
√
(n− 1)|Sε′ |. This requirement is met because the choice of
our parameters ε and ε′ implies that
|Aε′ | ≥ (1 − γε,ε′)q >
√
2(n− 1)T ′ >
√
(n− 1)T ≥
√
(n− 1)|Sε′ |.
Therefore, the algorithm A correctly produces a list that includes all the polynomials p of degree at most
n−1 satisfying |αr,p(r)|2 ≥ 1/q+ε′ for at least |Aε′ | indices r. Concerning the efficiency of the algorithm, we
note that the running time of A is bounded by a polynomial in (q, n). As a consequence, the list produced
by A includes all messages x for which PreO(Cx) ≥ 1/q + ε.
Since A is deterministic, we can execute it quantumly as well. In the end, we produce the desired list
with probability at least δ in time polynomial in (n, q, 1/δ, 1/(1− δ)). ✷
Due to the random sampling of quantum states necessary to apply for the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm,
the total number of oracle queries made by the quantum algorithm described in the above proof of Lemma
11 is at most T , guaranteeing the confidence δ. An important open question is whether the same confidence
δ can be achieved with a significantly fewer (e.g., a constant number of) queries.
To apply the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm, we have required the bias ε in the proof of Lemma 11 to be
relatively large. One may wonder whether, even if the bias is relatively small, there is another way to list-
decode the generalized Reed-Solomon codes from a quantumly corrupted codeword. In the next proposition,
we will show that any efficient quantum list decoder for the generalized Reed-Solomon codes with small
bias and high confidence can be used to solve all NP-problems efficiently on a quantum computer with high
success probability, leading to NP ⊆ BQP.
Proposition 12 Let t(n) be any function from N to N with t(n) ≥ n for all n ∈ N. If, for any arbitrary
bias ε(n), there exists a quantum list decoder A for the generalized Reed-Solomon codes with bias ε(n) and
confidence 2/3 running in t(n) time, then every NP-problem can be solved in nO(1)t(n) time by a certain
quantum algorithm with success probability at least 2/3. In particular, if A runs in polynomial time, then
NP ⊆ BQP holds.
Proof. We want to give a polynomial-time reduction from a certain suitable NP-complete problem to an
ε-QLDP for the GRS-code with respect to a specific quantumly corrupted codeword, where ε will be defined
later. As a target NP-complete problem, we choose the following restricted form of the interpolation problem
discussed by Goldreich, Rubinfeld, and Sudan [7].
Constrained Interpolation Problem (CIP)
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◦ Input: three numbers d, e,m ∈ N+, a prime number q, and a set A = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)} ⊆ Fq×Fq
of m points, expressed appropriately in binary.
◦ Requirement: dA(xi) = 2 for any index i ∈ [m], where dA(x) = |{y | (x, y) ∈ A}|.
◦ Question: is there any univariate polynomial p over Fq of degree at most d such that p(xi) = yi for
at least e different i’s?
Note that, when e = 1, we always take a polynomial p satisfying p(x1) = y1. Therefore, in what follows,
we assume that e ≥ 2.
The problem CIP is clearly in NP and it can be proven to be NP-hard.¶ As a starting point, let
d, e,m ∈ N+, let q be a prime number, and let A = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)} ⊆ Fq × Fq as an input to
the CIP. Let ℓ = (m − 1)/2. Any polynomial p(r) = ∑d+1i=1 ziri−1 for any r can be viewed as a codeword
GRS(ℓ,d+1,q)z , where z = z1z2 · · · zd+1. For convenience, since dA(xi) = 2 for all i’s, the set D = {x1, . . . , xm}
of code locators has cardinality exactly ℓ. Without loss of generality, we assume that ℓ+ 1 ≤ q.
Based on the set A, we wish to construct a quantumly corrupted codeword O. For any point (x, y) in
Fq × Fq, if (x, y) ∈ A, let αx,y = 1/
√
dA(x); otherwise, let αx,y = 0. The amplitude set {αx,y}x,y∈Fq defines
O as O|x〉|s〉|t〉 =∑y∈Fq αx,y|x〉|y ⊕ s〉|t〉. Define ε = 1/q − e/2ℓ.
It is not difficult to show that, for any polynomial p of degree d, p passes on at least e points in A if and
only if the presence of p (seen as a codeword) in O satisfies the inequalities:
PreO(GRS
(ℓ,d+1,q)
z ) =
1
|D|
∑
x∈D
|αx,p(x)|2 ≥
1
ℓ
e∑
i=1
1
2
=
e
2ℓ
=
1
q
+ ε,
provided that p is identical with GRS(ℓ,d+1,q)z . Therefore, solving the CIP can be reduced to solving the ε-
QLDP for the GRS-code {GRS(ℓ,d+1,q)}ℓ,d,q with respect to O. Moreover, it takes only quantum polynomial-
time to realize O from the set A (which is given as an input). Applying a t(n)-time quantum list decoder
for the ε-QLDP with confidence 2/3, we can obtain a valid list of polynomials p. Obviously, the size of the
obtained list is at most t(n). Since the list may contain certain illegitimate polynomials, we need to check
that every candidate p passes on at least e different points in A. If the list contains a legitimate polynomial,
we output “YES”; otherwise, output “NO.” This quantum algorithm solves the CIP with success probability
at least 2/3.
If this quantum algorithm runs in polynomial time, we can solve efficiently the CIP with high probability,
leading to the inclusion NP ⊆ BQP because the CIP is NP-complete. ✷
Despite the power of quantum computation, it seems unlikely that polynomial-time quantum algorithms
can solve all the NP-problems with high success probability. Proposition 12 thus leaves little hope for
finding a “polynomial-time” quantum list decoder for the GRS-codes with a smaller bias. However, it seems
a challenging task to determine the exact threshold of such a bias for efficient quantum list decoders to exist.
4.2 Noisy Polynomial Interpolation Problem
As Proposition 12 indicates, for the generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes, we may not be able to obtain a
polynomial-time quantum list decoder having extremely small bias; however, it is still meaningful to study,
for example, subexponential-time quantum list decoders with relatively small bias for the GRS-codes and
thus to seek their applications to the field of computational cryptography. Here, we wish to propose one of
those possible applications.
Earlier, Naor and Pinkas [15] studied the noisy polynomial interpolation problem (NPIP) as an intractable
assumption for a new cryptographic primitive, called oblivious polynomial evaluation. We restate their noisy
interpolation problem as a promise problem of finding a unique polynomial passing through exactly one
point from each given set.
Noisy Polynomial Interpolation Problem (NPIP)
◦ Input: three numbers k,m, n ∈ N+, a prime number q, n distinct points {x1, x2, . . . , xn} in Fq, and n
sets S1, . . . , Sn, each of which consists of exactly m elements from Fq, where k + 1 ≤ n ≤ q.
◦ Promise: there exists a unique polynomial p of degree at most k such that, for each index i ∈ [n],
there exists exactly one element y ∈ Si satisfying p(xi) = y.
◦ Output: the hidden polynomial p.
¶This fact is observed by examining the reduction constructed by Goldreich, Rubinfeld, and Sudan [7] from the subset sum
problem, which is known to be NP-complete.
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Disappointingly, no polynomial-time algorithm has been so far known to solve this promise problem
NPIP. Apparent similarity exists between this problem and the GRS-codes (see, e.g., Roth [18]) and, in the
following proposition, this similarity helps us solve the NPIP using suitable quantum list decoders for the
GRS-codes if such list decoders are actually built.
Proposition 13 If, for any bias parameter ε(n), there exists a quantum list-decoder for any GRS(n,k+1,q)-
code with bias ε(n) and confidence 2/3, then there exists a quantum algorithm that solves the NPIP with
probability at least 2/3.
Proof. Take n distinct elements X = {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ Fq and n sets S1, . . . , Sn of m elements each. Let us
assume that the promise of the NPIP holds for a unique polynomial, say, p∗ of degree at most k. Note that
k,m, n ≤ q. We set the bias parameter ε to be 1/m− 1/q, and let S be ⋃i∈[n] Si.
Here, we define the ε-QLDP for the GRS(n,k+1,q)-code with respect to a quantumly corrupted codeword
O, which is defined by O|xi〉|0〉 = 1√m
∑
y∈S αxi,y|xi〉|y〉 for each index i ∈ [n], where αxi,y = 1 if y ∈ Si and
0 otherwise. We first claim that the unique polynomial p∗ satisfies the condition PreO(p∗) ≥ 1/q + ε. Since
|X | = n, it follows that
PreO(p
∗) =
1
|X |
∑
x∈X
|αx,p∗(x)|2 =
1
n
∑
x∈X
1
m
=
1
q
+
(
1
m
− 1
q
)
≥ 1
q
+ ε.
Hence, p∗ has codeword presence at least 1/q + ε.
The assumption of the proposition guarantees the existence of a quantum list decoder A that solves
the ε-QLDP with confidence 2/3. To realize O from the given inputs (x1, . . . , xn, S1, . . . , Sn) of the NPIP,
we generate the quantum state O|xi〉|s〉 by choosing y in S uniformly at random and then generating the
amplitude αxi,y/
√
m. For the NPIP, let us consider the following quantum algorithm.
Taking (k,m, n, q), (x1, . . . , xn) and S1, . . . , Sn as input instance, run the quantum list decoder
A using O as an oracle. We then obtain a list of polynomials p that satisfy PreO(p) ≥ 1/q + ε.
Since the hidden polynomial p∗ must be in the list, we deterministically check, through this list,
whether each polynomial passes exactly one point from each set Si. The uniqueness of p
∗ ensures
that this algorithm eventually finds p∗.
It is not difficult to show that the above quantum algorithm solves the NPIP with success probability at
least 2/3 because A has confidence 2/3. ✷
4.3 Bounded Distance Vector Problem
The previous section has sought out an application of a quantum list decoder for the generalized Reed-
Solomon (GRS) codes. Here, we further intend to explore its relevant computational problems. Let us
recall that codewords (viewed as functions) of the GRS codes can be identified with polynomials. Since
polynomials are closely related to certain types of lattice problems, by exploiting this relationship, we will
introduce a specific lattice problem, which we preferably call the bounded distance vector problem (BDVP).
Next, we will show that any quantum algorithm solving this BDVP with high probability yields, for any bias
ε, a quantum list decoder for GRS-codes with bias ε and relatively high confidence. The problem BDVP is
formally described as follows.
Bounded Distance Vector Problem (BDVP)
◦ Input: a number n ∈ N+, m basis vectors b1, b2, . . . , bm ∈ Zn, and a radius ξ ∈ Q≥0.
◦ Implicit Input: an oracle that, given a vector v ∈ Zn, returns the square of the weighted norm,
‖v‖2 = ∑j∈[n] λ2jv2j , where λ = (λj)j ∈ [0, 1]n is a predetermined (but hidden) weight vector and
v = (v1, . . . , vn).
◦ Output: a list that contains all vectors v in the lattice L spanned by {b1, b2, . . . , bm} for which
‖v‖2 ≤ ξ holds.
In the next proposition, we show the aforementioned relationship between the BDVP and quantum list
decoding.
Proposition 14 If there exists a quantum algorithm that solves the BDVP with probability at least 2/3,
then, for any positive bias ε, there exists a quantum list decoder for the family of generalized Reed-Solomon
codes with bias ε and confidence 2/3.
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Proof. A basic idea of using Lagrange’s interpolation formulas in the following argument comes from
Bleichenbacher and Nguyen [3]. To prove the proposition, it suffices to construct a quantum “reduction” to
the BDVP from the ε-QLDP for the generalized Reed-Solomon code GRS(M,n,q), where ε is any positive bias.
Let us assume that the BDVP with a hidden weight vector is quantumly solvable with success probability
at least 2/3. We start with an arbitrary input instance given to the ε-QLDP for GRS(M,n,q).
Fix a message length n arbitrarily. Let ε be any positive bias and assume, without loss of generality,
that ε is a rational number. Fix a set DM = {x1, x2, . . . , xM} of M distinct code locators in Fq and
express the Cartesian product DM × Fq as {(xi, zj) | i ∈ [M ], j ∈ [q]}. Let O denote any quantumly
corrupted codeword O for GRS(M,n,q) and assume that O|xi〉|s〉|0〉 =
∑
j∈[q] αi,j |xi〉|s ⊕ zj〉|φi,j〉, where
|φi,j〉 is a certain unit-norm quantum state. Let a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ (Fq)n be any hidden message and let
pa(x) =
∑
k∈[n] akx
k−1 (mod q) denote its codeword GRS(M,n,q)a , which is a polynomial over Fq of degree at
most n− 1. Now, assume that PreO(pa) = 1M
∑
i∈[M ] |αxi,pa(xi)|2 ≥ 1/q + ε.
Next, we will define an instance to the BDVP. Firstly, we define our radius ξ ∈ Q as M(1 − 1/q − ε).
Secondly, we define a lattice L spanned by certain basis vectors {b1, b2, . . . , bm} as follows. The (special)
Lagrange interpolation polynomials corresponding to DM are Li(x) =
∏
j∈[M ]−{i}
x−xj
xi−xj in Fq[x], which are
polynomials of degreeM−1, for each index i ∈ [M ]. Every polynomial Li(x) satisfies the following property:
Li(xi) = 1 and Li(xj) = 0 if j 6= i. Here, we assume that Li(x) is of the form
∑
k∈[M ] cikx
k−1 for certain
constants cik in Fq. Note that pa satisfies the Lagrange’s interpolation formula:
pa(x) =
∑
i∈[M ]
pa(xi)Li(x) =
∑
i∈[M ]
∑
j∈[q]
δ
(a)
ij zjLi(x)
=
∑
k∈[M ]

∑
i∈[M ]
∑
j∈[q]
δ
(a)
ij zjcik

xk−1,
where δ
(a)
ij = 1 if pa(xi) = zj and 0 otherwise. Obviously, for each fixed pair i and a, it holds that∑
j∈[q] δ
(a)
ij = 1. The vector δ
(a) = (δ
(a)
ij )ij ∈ ZqM becomes our target vector in the desired lattice L (which
will be defined below).
We consider only vectors d = (dij)ij ∈ ZqM satisfying the condition
deg
(∑
k∈[M ]
(∑
i∈[M ]
∑
j∈[q] dijzjcik
)
xk−1
)
≤ n, which is equivalent to∑i∈[M ]∑j∈[q] dijzjcik = 0 (mod q)
for every index k ∈ [n+ 1, q]Z. Moreover, d should satisfy that
∑q
j=1 dij =
∑q
j=1 di′j for all pairs (i, i
′). At
last, the lattice L is defined as the collection of all vectors d = (dij)ij ∈ ZqM such that
1.
∑
j∈[q] dij =
∑
j∈[q] di′j (mod q) for all pairs i, i
′ ∈ [M ]; and
2.
∑
i∈[M ]
∑
j∈[q] dijzjcik = 0 (mod q) for all k ∈ [n+ 1,M ]Z.
It is not difficult to show that L forms a lattice. It is important to note that the target vector δ(a) belongs
to L. From the definition of L, a suitable set of basis vectors {b1, b2, . . . , bm} for L can be found easily (see,
e.g., Bleichenbacher and Nguyen [3]).
Finally, we introduce an oracle O′ for the BDVP. To formulate this O′, it suffices to define its associ-
ated weight vector λ = (λij)ij ∈ [0, 1]qM . For each point (xi, zj) ∈ DM × Fq, let λi,j =
√
1− |αxi,zj |2.
The weighted norm ‖d‖ of a vector d = (dij)ij ∈ L is thus calculated as ‖d‖ =
√∑
i,j d
2
ijλ
2
ij =√∑
i,j d
2
ij(1 − |αxi,zj |2). Therefore, the square of the weighted norm of δ(a) equals
‖δ(a)‖2 =
∑
i∈[M ]
∑
j∈[q]
(
δ
(a)
ij
)2 (
1− |αxi,pa(xi)|2
)
= M −
∑
i∈[M ]
|αxi,pa(xi)|2
= M (1− PreO(pa)) .
Since ξ =M(1− 1/q − ε), it follows that ‖δ(a)‖2 ≤ ξ iff PreO(pa) ≥ 1/q + ε.
To solve the ε-QLDP for GRS(M,n,q) with respect to O, we first compute the set of basis vectors b1, . . . , bm
and the radius ξ as defined above. We then solve the BDVP using the weight vector (given by the oracle
O′) with success probability at least 2/3. Let v1, . . . , vk be the resulted list of vectors in L. For each vi, find
ai ∈ (Fq)n such that vi = δ(ai) by solving a set of linear equations. These ai’s form a list that contains all
messages satisfying PreO(pa) ≥ 1/q + ε. Moreover, this list can be obtained with probability at least 2/3.
It is not difficult to show that the above-described quantum algorithm indeed solves the ε-QLDP for
GRS(M,n,q). This completes the proof of Proposition 14. ✷
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5 An Application to Quantum Search Problems
Theorem 1 has given an efficiently quantumly list-decodable code family C over a fixed code alphabet that
has polynomially small code rate; in addition, C is also efficiently classically list decodable. This fulfills our
primary goal of this paper. As the next goal, we will seek an application of such an interesting code family
to computational complexity theory. Of all possible applications, we will choose an issue on approximate
solvability of quantum search problems. For ease of description, we use the notation ProbM [M(x) = b]
to denote the probability that observing the final configuration of a quantum algorithm M starting with
input x results in b. Analogous to NP-search problems, an NBQP-search problem P is formally defined as a
triplet (Σ∗,M, p), where M is a polynomial-time quantum algorithm taking inputs from Σ∗ ×Σ∗ and p is a
polynomial, together with the requirement that, for every x ∈ Σ∗ and every witness y ∈ Σp(|x|), there exists
a bit b such that ProbM [M(x, y) = b] ≥ 2/3. For each x ∈ Σ∗, let Sx,M = {y ∈ Σp(|x|) | ProbM [M(x, y) =
1] ≥ 2/3} be the set of solutions of x. For simplicity, we fix our message alphabet Σ to be {0, 1} throughout
this section.
NBQP-Search Problem
◦ input: a (binary) string x of length n;
◦ output: a solution y ∈ Sx,M for x if Sx 6= Ø. Otherwise, output ⊥ (a special symbol not in Σ).
Define LM = {x | Sx,M 6= Ø}. A solution function f for the NBQP-search problem P = (Σ∗,M, p)
satisfies that (i) for every x ∈ LM , f(x) belongs to Sx,M and (ii) for every x 6∈ LM , f(x) = ⊥. We also
introduce a class NBQP of decision problems as follows: a language L belongs to NBQP if and only if there
exist a polynomial-time quantum algorithm M and a polynomial p for which (Σ∗,M, p) is an NBQP-search
problem and L = LM .
We want to show that a certain NBQP-search problem cannot be solved even “approximately” if BQP 6=
NBQP.
Proposition 15 Assuming that BQP 6= NBQP, for every positive polynomial triplet (p, p′, p′′) with p′(n) >
p(n) for all numbers n ∈ N, there exists an NBQP-search problem P = (Σ∗,M, p) that satisfies the following:
for any solution function f for P, no polynomial-time quantum algorithm B finds strings y, on each input
x ∈ LM of length n, with probability at least 1− 2p(n)p′(n)(p(n)+2) such that the relative distance ∆(y, f(x)) is at
most 1/2− 1/p(n); on every input x 6∈ LM , B outputs ⊥ with probability at least 1/2 + 1/p′′(n).
This proposition roughly implies that solving NBQP-search problems on average leads to solving them
in worst case. The proof of the proposition requires the following technical lemma, which gives a method of
computing solution functions. Recall from Section 2.4 the notation (f(x))i.
Lemma 16 Let s be any positive polynomial with s(n) ≥ 6 for every n ∈ N. The following two statements
are logically equivalent.
1. For every NBQP-search problem P = (Σ∗,M, p), there exist its solution function g and a polynomial-
time quantum algorithm A such that (i) for every x ∈ LM , ProbA,i[A(x, 1i) = (g(x))i] ≥ 1/2+1/s(|x|)
and (ii) for every x 6∈ LM , ProbA,i[A(x, 1i) = 0] ≥ 1/2 + 1/s(|x|), where “i” is a random variable
uniformly distributed over [p(n)].
2. For every NBQP-search problem, there exist its solution function f and a polynomial-time quantum
algorithm B such that, for every x ∈ Σ∗, ProbB[B(x) = f(x)] ≥ 2/3.
With the help of the above lemma, we give the proof of Proposition 15.
Proof of Proposition 15. We show the proposition by contradiction. First of all, we assume that
BQP 6= NBQP. Toward a contradiction, we assume that there exist a positive polynomial triplet (p, p′, p′′)
satisfying p′(n) > p(n) for every n ∈ N that meet the following requirement: for any choice of NBQP-
search problem P = (Σ∗,M, p), there are a solution function g for P and a polynomial-time quantum
algorithm B for which (i) on each input x ∈ LM , B finds with probability at least 1− 2p(n)p′(n)(p(n)+2) a string y
satisfying ∆(y, g(x)) ≤ 1/2− 1/p(n) and (ii) on every input x 6∈ LM , B outputs ⊥ with probability at least
1/2 + 1/p′′(n). Let us fix a polynomial s satisfying that s(n) ≥ max{6, p′′(n), p′(n)p(n)/(p′(n) − p(n))} for
all numbers n ∈ N. Notice that LM belongs to NBQP.
We wish to compute (g(x))i from (x, 1
i) using B so that we obtain Lemma 16(1). Let us consider the
following algorithm A: on input (x, 1i), run the quantum algorithm B on input x and then output the ith
bit of its outcome y if y 6= ⊥, and output 0 otherwise.
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Let x be an arbitrary string of length n. If x ∈ LM , then the average probability of A producing (g(x))i
correctly over all i’s is lower-bounded by
ProbA,i[A(x, 1i) = (g(x))i] ≥
(
1− 2p(n)
p′(n)(p(n) + 2)
)(
1−max
y
{∆(y, g(x))}
)
≥
(
1− 2p(n)
p′(n)(p(n) + 2)
)(
1−
(
1
2
− 1
p(n)
))
=
1
2
+
1
p(n)
− 1
p′(n)
≥ 1
2
+
1
s(n)
,
where the maximization is taken over all strings y produced by B that satisfy ∆(y, g(x)) ≤ 1/2− 1/p(n). If
x 6∈ LM , then it follows that ProbA,i[A(x, 1i) = 0] = ProbB[B(x) = ⊥] ≥ 1/2+1/p′′(n) ≥ 1/2+1/s(n). Since
P is arbitrary, the statement of Lemma 16(1) holds. Lemma 16(2) then provides us with a polynomial-time
quantum algorithm that computes a certain solution function f correctly with probability at least 2/3. Since
LM = {x | f(x) ∈ Σ∗} holds, LM must be recognized with probability at least 2/3 on a quantum computer
in polynomial time; thus, LM belongs to BQP. As a result, we conclude that NBQP is included in BQP, a
contradiction against our assumption that BQP 6= NBQP. ✷
Finally, we present the proof of Lemma 16, in which we extensively utilize an efficiently quantumly and
classically list-decodable code family given in Theorem 1.
Proof of Lemma 16. Let s be any positive polynomial with s(n) ≥ 6 for every n ∈ N. Because we
consider only sufficiently large lengths n, we can assume without loss of generality that, for a certain fixed
constant k ≥ 1, s(n) = nk holds for all numbers n ≥ 6. By Theorem 1, there are a polynomial-time
computable function t and a (t(n), n)2-code family C that has a polynomial-time quantum list decoder D,
with bias 1/s(n) and confidence 2/3, producing a list of message candidates, where n is a message length.
Let q denote a positive polynomial that bounds the sizes of any valid list produced by D. For convenience,
we also assume that t(n) ≥ n for all numbers n ∈ N. Moreover, we write D for a polynomial-time classical
list decoder for C. Note that, for each y, Cy denotes the codeword, to which y is encoded, of block length
t(|y|). For the sake of convenience, in this proof, we also identify this codeword Cy (defined as a function in
Section 2.1) as a t(n)-letter string Cy(0)Cy(1) · · ·Cy(t(n)− 1).
The implication (2) ⇒ (1) in the lemma is trivial, since 1/2 + 1/s(n) ≤ 2/3 and, if we can computer
f(x) with high probability, then we can compute its ith bit (f(x))i or the symbol ⊥ with success probability
at least 2/3. Hereafter, assuming (1), we intend to show (2). Let P = (Σ∗,M, p) be any NBQP-search
problem. To make our proof simple, we assume that p(n) ≥ n for all numbers n ∈ N. First, we reduce
the error probability of the quantum algorithm M to be exponentially small (without changing the witness
size). This step can be done by a standard technique of majority voting among polynomially many runs of
the original quantum algorithm. To be more precise, there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm M ′,
depending only on (p, r,M), that satisfies the following two conditions:
1. for every x ∈ LM and every y ∈ Sx,M , ProbM ′ [M ′(x, y) = 1] ≥ 1− 2−r(|x|); and
2. for any other pair (x, y) with y ∈ Σp(|x|), ProbM ′ [M ′(x, y) = 0] ≥ 1− 2−r(|x|),
where r(n) = q(p(n)) + 3. Notice that LM ′ coincides with LM .
Let us consider a quantum search problem P ′ = (Σ∗, N, p) defined by the following quantum algorithm
N .
On input (x, z) with n = |x|, if |z| 6= t(p(n)), then reject the input immediately. Otherwise, run
the classical list decoder D in polynomial time using z as a classically corrupted codeword (or
a received word) to produce with probability at least 5/6 a list T of message candidates for C.
Check deterministically whether z = Cy holds for a certain string y in T . If there is no such y,
reject the input. On the contrary, if z = Cy , then run M
′ on the input (x, y) and outputs its
outcome.
First, we claim that P ′ is indeed an NBQP-search problem. Fix an arbitrary n ∈ N, take any x ∈ Σn,
and consider the case in which x ∈ LM . Since there exists a witness y ∈ Σp(n) for x, y should be included
in the list T . Hence, its corresponding codeword z = Cy forces N to accept (x, z) with probability at least
5
6
(
1− 2−r(|x|)) ≥ 2/3, because r(n) ≥ 3. For the other case where x 6∈ LM , let z be any string in Σt(p(n)). If
z 6= Cy for all y ∈ T , then N rejects (x, z) with probability at least 5/6. By contrast, if z = Cy holds for a
certain y ∈ T , then N accepts (x, z) with probability ≤ 56 · 2−r(|x|) ≤ 1/3. Therefore, P ′ is an NBQP-search
problem.
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Again, applying the majority vote technique, we can reduce the error probability of N down to 2−r(n).
Abusing the notation, we use the same notation N to denote this new algorithm. For our NBQP-search
problem P ′, the statement (1) gives a solution function g and a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A for
which ProbA,i[A(x, 1i) = (g(x))i] ≥ 1/2 + 1/s(n) for every x ∈ LM ∩ Σn, and ProbA,i[A(x, 1i) = 0] ≥
1/2 + 1/s(n) for every x ∈ Σn − LM . Now, assume that the final quantum state A|x, 1i〉 has the form
A|x, 1i〉 = αx,i,0|i〉|0〉|φx,0〉+ αx,i,1|i〉|1〉|φx,1〉
with certain amplitudes {αx,i,b}x,i,b, where ‖|φx,b〉‖ = 1 for any bit b. It is obvious that ProbA,i[A(x, 1i) =
(g(x))i] = (1/p(n))
∑
i∈[p(n)] |αx,i,(g(x))i |2 for x ∈ LM and ProbA,i[A(x, 1i) = 0] = (1/p(n))
∑
i∈[p(n)] |αx,i,0|2
for x 6∈ LM .
We fix an arbitrary x ∈ LM of length n and, in the meantime, we omit script “x.” Let us define an oracle
O as
O|i〉|e〉|0〉 = αi,0|i〉|e ⊕ 0〉|φi,0〉+ αi,1|i〉|e⊕ 1〉|φi,1〉
for any e ∈ {0, 1} and any i ∈ [p(n)]. This oracle O is a quantumly corrupted codeword for C and obviously
O can be realized by A. If there exists a string y satisfying Cy = g(x), then the presence of Cy in O is
calculated as
PreO(Cy) =
1
p(n)
∑
i
|αi,Cy(i)|2 =
1
p(n)
∑
i
|αi,(g(x))i |2 ≥
1
2
+
1
s(n)
.
This makes us possible to run D using O to list-decode C.
Finally, we define a new quantum algorithm B, based on the quantum list decoder D for C, that finds a
witness of the problem P ′. Recall that D produces a list of size at most q(n′) for each message length n′.
We assume the standard lexicographic order in Σp(n). Let us consider the following quantum algorithm B.
On input x (n = |x|), run D using O as an oracle to produce a list T ′ of at most q(p(n)) message
candidates (since the message size is p(n)), which includes the solution g(x) (if x ∈ LM ) or
the string 0p(n) (if x 6∈ LM ), with probability at least 1 − 2−r(n). Run N on the input (x, z)
sequentially for all elements z ∈ T ′ in order. Output the lexicographically smallest z ∈ T ′ for
which N(x, z) outputs 1 if any. On the contrary, if there is no such z, output ⊥.
Let f(x) denote the minimal string z in T ′ such that (i) ProbN [N(x, z) = 1] ≥ 1 − 2−r(n) and (ii)
ProbN [N(x, z
′) = 0] ≥ 1 − 2−r(n) for all z′ < z in T ′ if any; let f(x) = ⊥ otherwise. Since |T ′| ≤ q(p(n)),
the probability that B on input x of length n outputs f(x) correctly is lower-bounded by
(
1− 2−r(n)
)q(p(n))
≥ 1− 2−r(n)+q(p(n))−1 ≥ 3/4.
This guarantees that the success probability of obtaining f(x) is at least 3/4. Since P is arbitrary, the
statement (2) should hold. ✷
6 Local Quantum List Decoding
The previous sections have dealt with a specific computational model using implicit inputs and explicit
outputs. When the running time of a quantum list decoder is limited to sublinear, however, it becomes
impossible to produce a short list of messages explicitly. In such a case, it is better to allow the quantum
list decoder to produces a list of short “descriptions” of oracle quantum circuits, each of which can generate
every block symbol of a specific message by means of an appropriate oracle access to a given quantumly
corrupted codeword. We call such a model an implicit-input implicit-output model. We will discuss a realm
of quantum list decoding on this specific model and briefly state two results on the hardness amplification
of quantum circuits.
Let us first introduce the notion of local quantum list decoding, analogous to the well-known notion of
local list decoding.
Definition 17 (local quantum list decoding) Let C be any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code family with a mes-
sage alphabet Σ (not depending on the choice of n). We say that C is locally quantum list decodable with bias
ε and confidence δ if there exists a quantum algorithm A such that, for any message length n ∈ N, any quan-
tumly corrupted codeword O for C, and any message x = x1x2 · · ·xn ∈ Σn satisfying PreO(Cx) ≥ 1/q+ε(n),
the following two conditions hold with probability at least 3/4:
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1. A(n) outputs a list of “descriptions” of ℓ oracle quantum circuits D1, D2, . . . , Dℓ; and
2. there exists an index j ∈ [ℓ] such that, for every index i ∈ [n] (expressed in binary), DOj on input i
outputs xi with probability at least δ(n)
Similarly to the concatenated code family CGRS-H , we can define another concatenated code family
CRM-H using appropriate Reed-Mu¨ller codes instead of the generalized Reed-Solomon codes. Following an
argument of Sudan, Trevisan, and Vadhan [21], we can claim that the code CRM-H is efficiently locally
quantumly list decodable with polynomially small bias and confidence 2/3. For the proof of this claim, by
Lemma 10, it suffices for us to construct an efficient quantum list decoder for the Reed-Mu¨ller codes by
following Sudan, Trevisan, and Vadhan [21]. Such a quantum list decoder can be given by employing an
argument similar to that of Lemma 11. Hence, we can conclude:
Proposition 18 There exists a code family of polynomially small rate and constant codeword alphabet size
that are efficiently locally quantum list decodable with polynomially small bias and confidence 2/3.
An immediate consequence of this proposition is the hardness amplification of quantum circuits, obtained
by again following an argument of Sudan, Trevisan, and Vadhan [21].
Corollary 19 There exists a constant d > 0 for which the following is true. Let ε ∈ (0, 1) and let f be
any Boolean function from {0, 1}k(n) for a certain function k(n). If no quantum circuit of size s computes
f with success probability at least δ, then there exists a Boolean function g mapping {0, 1}ℓ(k(n)) to {0, 1}
with a certain function ℓ(n) ∈ nO(1) such that no quantum circuit C of size s′ = (k(n)/ε)d · s satisfies
ProbC,x[C(x) = g(x)] ≥ 1/2 + ε, where C(x) denotes the random variable indicating the observed outcome
bit of C on input x.
7 Concluding Remarks and Open Problems
The main theme of this paper is to show the existence of a quantumly list-decodable code family of polyno-
mially small code rate over a fixed code alphabet and to seek its application to computational complexity
theory. To achieve such goals, we have considered certain codes made up of generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS)
codes, concatenated with the Hadamard codes, and we have proven that they are indeed efficiently quantum
list decodable whenever the bias of their codeword presence is relatively large. Notice that a core part of
the proof of this result heavily relies on a classical algorithm of Guruswami and Sudan [9] and it therefore
requires a relatively large number of queries. For certain types of applications, it may be desirable to make a
fewer queries. At present, we have no answer to the question of whether there exists a quantum list decoder
that makes a significantly fewer queries (say, less than the degree of a hidden polynomial).
Because of the different formulations of classical list decoding and quantum list decoding, we cannot verify
that all classically list decodable codes are also quantumly list decodable. Among all codes of polynomially
small rate, is there any quantum list decodable code that is not even classically list decodable?
When a bias becomes arbitrary small, in contrast, we have shown that the aforementioned concatenated
code is unlikely to be efficiently quantumly list decodable, because the GRS codes are unlikely to have
efficient quantum list decoders against arbitrary small bias. If we relax the running time of list decoders,
can we build a subexponential-time quantum list decoder for the GRS code against arbitrary bias? Another
important open problem is to find useful applications of quantum list decoding to a wide range of topics in
quantum information processing.
Appendix
In this appendix, we will present the proofs of Propositions 2–3, which have left unproven in Section 2.3.
The proof of Proposition 2 comes from an early result of Kawachi and Yamakami [13] and the proof of
Proposition 3 closely follows an argument of Guruswami, H˚astad, Sudan, and Zuckerman [8].
We begin with the proof of Proposition 2. Earlier, Kawachi and Yamakami [13] presented a relatively good
upper bound on the size of a message list in terms of the value of codeword presence by employing a geometric
method of Guruswami and Sudan [11], who gave a q-ary extension of the well-known Johnson bound. Let
C be any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code family with a message space Σn and define Pq(n)(M(n), d(n), ε(n)) as
supO {|{x ∈ Σn | PreO(Cx) ≥ ε(n)}|}, where “sup” is taken over all quantumly corrupted codeword O for
C. The following statement is a slight modification of Lemma 3.4 of Kawachi and Yamakami [13] and we
therefore omit its proof.
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Lemma 20 Let n be any message length. Let (ε(n), q(n), d(n),M(n)) satisfy the inequality ε(n) >
ℓ(n), where ℓ(n) equals 1/q(n) + (1− 1/q(n))
√
1− (d(n)/M(n)) (q(n)/(q(n)− 1)). Assume that
C is an (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code family. The value Pq(n)(M(n), d(n), ε(n)) is upper-bounded by
min
{
M(n)(q(n)− 1), d(n)(1−1/q(n))d(n)(1−1/q(n))+M(n)̺(n)
}
, where ̺(n) = (ε(n) − 1/q(n))2 − (1− 1/q(n))2. In the case
of ε(n) = ℓ(n), it holds that Pq(n)(M(n), d(n), ε(n)) ≤ 2M(n)(q(n)− 1)− 1.
Proposition 2 easily follows from Lemma 20.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code family C. Since λ is the relative distance
of C, it follows that λ = d(n)/M(n). For readability, we will omit the parameter “n” in the following
calculation. Let c > 0 be a constant and suppose that the upper bound of Pq(M,d, ε) given in Lemma 20
does not exceed anc; that is, assuming ε > ℓ, it holds that
Pq(M,d, ε) ≤ d (1− 1/q)
d (1− 1/q) +M̺ ≤ an
c.
From the last inequality, we immediately obtain
M
(
ε− 1
q
)2
≥ d (1− 1/q)
anc
− d
(
1− 1
q
)
+M
(
1− 1
q
)2
,
since ̺ = (ε− 1/q)2 − (1− 1/q)2. The absolute value |ε− 1/q| is thus lower-bounded by
|ε− 1
q
| ≥
(
d (1− 1/q)
Manc
− d (1− 1/q)
M
+
(
1− 1
q
)2)1/2
.
Assuming that ε ≥ 1/q, we therefore conclude
ε ≥ 1
q
+
(
1− 1
q
)(
1− d
M (1− 1/q) +
d
Manc (1− 1/q)
)1/2
.
Moreover, in the case of ε = ℓ, the definition of ℓ yields ε = 1q +
(
1− 1q
)(
1− dM(1−1/q)
)1/2
. Since
QLpolyc (λ) ≥ ε, the proposition follows immediately from the relation λ = d/M .
The second part of the proposition can be directly obtained by making c approach to the infinity. ✷
Next, we give the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let q be any odd prime number and fix c ∈ N+ and R ∈ (0, 1) arbitrarily
to satisfy c > 2(q − 1). Let n = ⌊MR⌋ and set In = [0,M − 1]Z. In this proof, we consider only linear
(M,n)q-codes. Recall from Section 2.3 the notations Vn, Wn, and E(w, ε). For brevity, let ε = QU
const
c (R)
and set 0 = 0M and t = q − 1.
Since Vn is composed of all vectors v = (vr,z)r∈In,z∈Fq with vr,z ∈ [0, t]Z and
∑
z∈Fq vr,z = t for every
index r ∈ In, it follows that |Vn| ≥ qM . Note that, for every v ∈ Vn, the vector vˆ = (vr,z/t)r,z belongs to
Wn. Write vˆr,z for vr,z/t. Let the notation Vr,n denote the rth block of Vn. Note that Vr,n is related to
Faulhaber’s formula and it holds that
|Vr,n| =
t∑
jq−1=0

· · · j3∑
j2=0

 j2∑
j1=0
1

 · · ·

 = tq−1
(q − 1)! + Θ(t
q−2).
Hence, we obtain |Vn| ≤
∏M
i=1 |Vr,n| ≤
(
tq−1
qq
)M
. Here, we want to introduce a new notion. For any subset
A ⊆ Vn and any function f :W → R, a restricted expectation EˇA[f(vˆ)] is defined to be 1|Vn|
∑
v∈Vn A(v)f(vˆ),
where A(v) is the characteristic function for A (i.e., A(v) = 1 if v ∈ A and A(v) = 0 otherwise). For
simplicity, let α denote (1− ε) (q−2)M2 q (c−q)M2c . In the rest of this proof, we assume that qMRα < 1. If we can
find a linear (M,n)q-code C such that, for every v ∈ Vn, there exists a vector b ∈ C satisfying Prevˆ(b) < ε,
our assumption qMRα < 1 implies that
QU constc (R) ≥ ε = 1− α
2
(q−2)M q−
c−q
c(q−2) ≥ 1− q− (1+2R)c−q(q−2)c .
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Therefore, the remaining task is to show the existence of a linear code C that satisfies the following condition:
for every v ∈ Vn, |E(vˆ, ε) ∩ C| ≤ c holds under the assumption of qMRα < 1.
Hereafter, we construct C by stages. The notation Ci expresses a code defined at Stage i ∈ [0, n]Z and,
in the end of our construction, we set the desired code C to be Cn. The key notion for this construction
is the potential function Si for Ci defined as Si = EˇVn [|Vn|
1
c
|E(vˆ,ǫ)∩Ci|] for each index i ∈ [0, n]Z. At Stage
0, we set b0 = 0 and C0 = span{b0}. Clearly, for every v ∈ Vn, we have |E(vˆ, ǫ) ∩ C0| ≤ 1. Since
Prevˆ(0) =
1
M 〈v(0)|vˆ〉 = 1M
∑
r vˆr,0, it follows that Prevˆ(0) ≥ ǫ iff
∑
r∈In vˆr,0 ≥ ǫM . Next, we consider the
set T
(ε)
t = {v ∈ Vn |
∑
r∈In vˆr,0 ≥ ǫMt}. Here, we give a crude estimation to the size of T
(ε)
t as follows. The
average value of vˆr,0 over all r ∈ In is tε, and at most a half of them should be at least this value. Hence,
each block indexed r contains at most (q−1)(1−ε)
q−2
t |Vr,n| possible choices of vectors v = (vr,z)z∈Fq . Since
there are at most M ! possible series (vr,0)r∈In and M ! ≤ t(1/2−(q−1)/c)M , |T (ε)t | is upper-bounded by
|T (ε)t | ≤ M ! ·
(
(q − 1)(1− ε)q−2
t
· |V0,n|
) 1
2M
|V0,n| 12M
≤ (1 − ε) (q−2)M2 qM2 t− q−1c M |Vn|.
Note that v ∈ T (ε)t iff 0 ∈ E(vˆ, ǫ) iff |E(vˆ, ǫ) ∩ C0| = 1. Therefore, since |Vn|1/c ≤
(
tq−1
qq
)M/c
, we can
calculate S0 as
S0 = EˇVn−T (ε)t [1] + EˇT (ε)t [|Vn|
1/c] =
|Vn − T (ε)t |
|Vn| +
|Vn|1/c|T (ε)t |
|Vn|
≤ 1 + (1− ε) (q−2)M2 q (c−q)M2c = 1 + α.
At Stage i ≥ 1, we choose bi uniformly at random from Vn so that bi is linearly independent of b1, . . . , bi−1.
We define Ci = span{Ci−1 ∪ {bi}}. Since bi is a random variable, so is Ci. To complete the construction,
we should claim that |E(vˆ, ǫ) ∩ Cn| ≤ c for any v ∈ Vn. For this purpose, we will define a series {Sˆi}0≤i≤n
of “average” values of Si’s, starting with Sˆ0 = S0. Let us consider the conditional expectation E
′
bi+1
[Si+1 |
Si = Sˆi] over a random choice of bi+1 chosen uniformly at random from Vn − span{b1, . . . , bi}. Now,
we define Sˆi+1 by Sˆi+1 = E
′
bi+1
[Si+1|Si = Sˆi], and we want to show that Sˆn ≤ 6. Let the notation
Ebi+1 [Si+1 | Si = Sˆi] be defined similarly, except that bi+1 is taken uniformly at random from Vn. Similarly
to an argument of Guruswami, H˚astad, Sudan, and Zuckerman [8], it holds that Ebi+1 [Si+1 | Si = Sˆi] ≤ (Sˆi)q.
Since |Vn|−q
i
|Vn| · E′bi+1 [Si+1 | Si = Sˆi] ≤ Ebi+1 [Si+1 | Si = Sˆi], we conclude that E′bi+1 [Si+1|Si = Sˆi] ≤
(1− q−M+i)−1(Sˆi)q since |Vn| ≥ qM . Therefore, when i = n, we obtain
Sˆn ≤ (Sˆn−1)
q
1− q−M+n−1 ≤
(Sˆ0)
qn∏n−1
i=0 (1− q−M+i)qn−i
≤ 2(Sˆ0)q
n
,
where the last inequality follows from the lower bound
∏n−1
i=0 (1 − q−M+i)q
n−i ≥ 12 . Since qMRα < 1, it
follows that
Sˆn ≤ 2(Sˆ0)q
n ≤ 2 (1 + α)qn ≤ 2 (1 + 2qMRα) ≤ 2(1 + 2) = 6
since n ≤MR and (1+x)m ≤ 1+2mx for any andm ∈ N+ and any x < 1/m. By the definition of Si, it follows
that Sˆi ≥ |Vn|−1|Vn| 1c |E(vˆ,ε)∩Ci| for every v ∈ Vn. In particular, we obtain |Vn|−1|Vn| 1c |E(vˆ,ǫ)∩Cn| ≤ Sˆn ≤ 6,
and we therefore conclude that |E(vˆ, ǫ) ∩Cn| ≤
(
1 + log 6log |Vn|
)
c < c+ 1, as requested. ✷
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